Syracuse University

SURFACE
Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone
Projects

Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone
Projects

Spring 5-1-2009

Fatal Flu: History, Science, and Politics of the 1918 Influenza
Pandemic
Suzanne Vroman

Follow this and additional works at: https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone
Part of the Biochemistry Commons, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons, and the
Other History Commons

Recommended Citation
Vroman, Suzanne, "Fatal Flu: History, Science, and Politics of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic" (2009).
Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone Projects. 488.
https://surface.syr.edu/honors_capstone/488

This Honors Capstone Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Syracuse University Honors Program
Capstone Projects at SURFACE. It has been accepted for inclusion in Syracuse University Honors Program Capstone
Projects by an authorized administrator of SURFACE. For more information, please contact surface@syr.edu.

Fatal Flu: History, Science, and Politics of
the 1918 Influenza Pandemic
A Capstone Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements of the Renée Crown University Honors Program at
Syracuse University

Suzanne Vroman
Candidate for B.S. and B.A. Degrees
and Renée Crown University Honors
May 2009

Honors Capstone Project in Biochemistry and History

Capstone Project Advisor: __________________________
Dr. Junko Thérèse Takeda
Honors Reader: __________________________________
Dr. Sandra Lane

Honors Director: __________________________________
Samuel Gorovitz
Date: ___________________________________________

1

INTRODUCTION
As the First World War raged through Europe, in the spring of 1918, a
second crisis in America killed more people in one year than the Great War did in
four.1 Almost forgotten among historians by its last appearance in 1919, the
world’s most lethal influenza pandemic would contribute to more deaths in one
year than the Black Death took in the mid-14th century and AIDS in twenty-four
years.2 With the progressive development of American public health in larger
cities and with the founding of prestigious scientific institutions, in the early
1900s, it seemed that for the first time in history more soldiers would die on the
battlefield than in hospital beds from disease. Epidemiologists formulated the
germ theory of disease by the mid-19th century. Specialists from Robert Koch to
Louis Pasteur achieved victories over cholera, smallpox, and yellow fever.3
Therefore, as word spread of an unusual influenza outbreak in Fort Riley, Kansas,
in March 1918, little alarm was taken as thousands of soldiers went overseas.
However, by mid-October modern medicine and its first generation of scientists
would be forced to test their skills and knowledge of the scientific theory against
“the deadliest epidemic in human history.”4
The influenza epidemic of 1918-1919 not only devastated the nation and
the world, it was also a professional and political disaster. It revealed the national
government’s failure to respond effectively to a public health crisis. Without the
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virology and antibiotics that would be developed by scientists later in the century,
public health officials lacked necessary tools to control the epidemic in 1918.
Specifically, this thesis asks the question: what caused the 1918 influenza
pandemic to become so fatal? There is no simple answer. Although scientific
knowledge in the United States had greatly improved since the middle of the
nineteenth century, neither physicians nor scientists were equipped to control this
influenza. Without a complete understanding of how the influenza virus spread,
public health officials found themselves disorganized and overworked as they
fought a losing battle to reduce the number of people dying. The pressure to keep
a steady flow of troops traveling to and from Europe exacerbated the crisis.
However, the genetic makeup of this particular strain of influenza may also have
caused the virus to become more deadly than expected. With an unusually high
case fatality rate, the 1918 virus was probably more virulent than previous and
future influenza pandemics seen in the last century.
Nearly a century later, an avian influenza epidemic threatens the world,
because we lack a mechanism for controlling pandemic influenza. It is
impossible to predict an emergence of a future influenza pandemic, when or
where it might occur, what subtype it will be, and what degree of morbidity and
mortality it will produce. Since 1977, H1N1 and H3N2 viruses have both
produced seasonal global epidemics causing approximately 36,000 excessive
annual deaths in the United States.5 None of these viral descendants, however,
compares to the pathogenicity of the 1918 parent virus. Therefore, in terms of
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predicting and preparing for future pandemics, the 1918 “Spanish Flu” provides
the best case study for scientists, historians, and public health officials.
Historiography and Methodology
To understand how the influenza outbreak of 1918 turned into one of the
world’s deadliest pandemics in history, I will take a unique approach to tackling
the mystery of the “Spanish Influenza” by interpreting the high fatality rate from
both a social and natural scientific approach. This paper contains two distinct
parts. First, the will provide an historical analysis of the events of 1918. Second,
this thesis will discuss current scientific research of the 1918 influenza virus.
Chapters one to four will answer the following questions: first, what caused the
pandemic to become so fatal? Second, what was the social response to the
disease and how did the United States cope with the crisis of the war and outbreak
of influenza simultaneously? Third, what non-pharmaceutical interventions were
implemented and how effective were they in thwarting the pandemic? Finally,
within the last century how have virologists and medical historians remembered
and portrayed the 1918 pandemic?
This thesis belongs to present day analyses of the history of medicine.
Although the field of medical history is fairly new, it has transformed radically
within the last century. As Charles Rosenberg points out in Explaining
Epidemics, the early pioneers of medical history were primarily professionals
trained in medical schools, of which the majority made their living practicing
medicine.6 Medical history, therefore, served as a celebratory practice to honor
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the accomplishments achieved within the scholars’ own crafts. As a result, the
academic history of medical advancement took precedence over social, cultural,
and economic contexts of health and disease. An unspoken rule began to develop
that only those with clinical experience possessed the tools necessary to document
and understand the history of the profession. Therefore, until the latter part of the
twentieth century, medical history was written primarily by physicians for
physicians.
However, an interesting phenomenon developed within the last fifty years.
As scientific knowledge had continued to progress at an alarming rate, premedical studies as well as medical school training have included a smaller amount
of humanities courses within their curriculum, something the older medical
historians took for granted. At the same time, a general interest in the history of
medicine and medical ethics has also grown both within and beyond the
professional world. As a result, the social aspects of medicine and its relationship
to cultural values have created an interest among professional historians who have
filled the gap of documenting medical history. However, unlike physicians,
historians of medicine are less concerned about past accomplishments in the field
of medical research and more concerned with how doctors’ and patients’
experiences created new ways in which the body mediated gender, racial, and
class relations.
Historians interested in the social and political aspects of medical history
have portrayed these interests through numerous works. For example, Charles
Rosenberg’s The Cholera Years is a historical account of three cholera epidemics

5

occurring in the United States in 1832, 1849, and 1866. However, Rosenberg’s
objective is not to simply describe these epidemics but to understand the social
relations of America during the “cholera years.”7 For example, as Rosenberg
notes, a disease that was believed to have been caused by sin and corruption in
1832 became the consequence of faults in sanitation by 1866. Rosenberg showed
the potential of medical history to be something more than a celebratory field, and
instead to represent the intellectual, cultural, and social texture of an age.
In the twentieth century, a generation of critics of the American medical
system also laid the framework for a political interpretation of medical history.
This has developed around the economic and institutional problems of American
medicine. Mainly, how can we afford to pay for healthcare? Beatrix Hoffman’s
Wages of Sickness is one book that has examined this question through an
analysis of medical legislation that was debated in New York State in the
twentieth century.8 The United States has remained the only Western-developed
nation not to implement a national health care system. In her book, Hoffman
analyzes this exceptionalism and demonstrates through close examination of New
York legislation that there have been periodic moments of public debate about
health insurance policies in the United States. In addition these instances reveal
the economic forces and cultural beliefs that have hindered reform processes and,
as Hoffman argues, placed a political stigma on “socialized medicine” that has
continued to inhibit our abilities to assure access to health care.
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As noted, some historians of medicine are more concerned with studies on
social values while others have focused on political issues. In this thesis I will be
looking at both. The first chapter focuses more on the social response to the
disease and how the United States dealt with the pressures of the pandemic while
trying to maintain their support and patriotism for the federal government during
the time of the war. The second and third chapters focus more on the political
conflicts that developed during the height of the pandemic. On one level, disputes
between federal and state authorities created a disorganized system of
communication between the United States Public Health Service and local state
departments. In addition, the continuing pressures of World War I also created
disputes between civilian and military authorities as concerns for winning the war
took precedence over concerns for containing the spread of the pandemic.
Specific to the study of 1918, there are a number of secondary sources that
I will be drawing from throughout this paper. First published in 1976, Alfred W.
Crosby’s America’s Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918 offers an early
comprehensive account of the 1918 influenza pandemic. In his book, Crosby
analyzes the pandemic and measures the impact it had on America society, while
also questioning the lack of interest in the pandemic, and emphasizing its
significance to future public health disasters. Building from Crosby’s work, a
series of other recently published books have also contributed to further
understanding of the influenza pandemic. Most notably, Gina Kolata’s Flu: The
Story of the Great Influenza Pandemic and the Search for the Virus that Caused It
integrates accounts of personal experiences with modern research to bring the
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historical aspects of Crosby’s book up to date with the recent achievements in the
field of scientific research. In addition, John M. Barry’s book, The Great
Influenza Pandemic: The Epic Story of the Deadliest Plague in History, has
provided a more recent historical analysis with statistics and personal accounts
that illustrate the personal reactions of individuals of the time.
Historical analysis of the 1918 pandemic has only been able to answer part
of the question as to why this particular epidemic had an unusually high case
fatality rate. The second part of this paper, therefore, will be a scientific
examination of the 1918 virus in a present day setting. For 75 years scientific
research failed to answer the most basic questions surrounding the virulence of
the virus, and as a result historical evidence provided the only answers for
scholars hoping to uncover questions surrounding the epidemic. In 1995, a
breakthrough came as a scientific team identified archival influenza autopsy
materials collected in the autumn of 1918 and sequenced small viral RNA
fragments to determine the genomic structure of the virus.9 Within a few years,
the entire genomic sequence of the virus was determined, which has now made it
possible to produce studies mapping the virulence of the virus. Once again I will
be asking the question of what caused the virus to become so fatal. In this second
section of the paper, I will interpret and answer this question with a biological
explanation. The second question will be, what were the genetic origins of the
1918 pandemic? Third, specifically what effect on viral replication do the cellular
protein P58 and viral protein NS1contribute to? Some of these studies were the
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focus of my scientific research at the Katze Lab in Seattle, Washington and will
be discussed in the second part of this paper.
This thesis will take a unique approach to studying the 1918 “Spanish Flu”
pandemic by integrating historical knowledge of the 1918 epidemic into present
day scientific methods for combating disease. Typically historic and scientific
disciplines have not intersected. However, in order to understand the 1918
pandemic and apply this knowledge to current preparedness plans for pandemic
influenza, it is necessary to take an interdisciplinary approach. By answering key
questions from both fields, I hope this thesis will provide a new insight to ways in
which we can study disease through unconventional forms of translational
research.
Chapter Outline
In the first chapter I will discuss the overall national threat created by the
onset of the 1918 influenza pandemic in the fall of 1918. Specifically, my
analysis will focus on the significance of the United States Public Health Service
(USPHS) and its response to the pandemic of 1918. Sill in its infancy, the United
States Public Health Service faced many initial challenges and the pandemic
exposed the need for stronger government involvement and expanded federal role
in safeguarding the nation’s health. I will explore how the American society
reacted and responded to the threat of a pandemic, and how the USPHS both
increased and reduced the fear and threat of disease on the home front.
To do this, I will be drawing from a number of sources. The American
Journal of Public Health provides the best account of the bureaucratic struggles
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between federal and state authorities that resulted in an unorganized plan for
quarantining and delivering care to areas greatly affected by the pandemic.
Throughout the year of 1918 the journal also describes the poor surveillance
methods and lack of communication amongst hospitals. These practices led to
inaccurate reports of morbidity and mortality statistics, which hindered the efforts
of the United States Public Health Service to control the rapid spread of the
epidemic. There are also two secondary sources from which I will be drawing.
The first, Alfred Crosby’s America’s Forgotten Pandemic, provides the best
overall history of the 1918 pandemic and includes a great description of the
formation of the United States Public Health Service. Carol A. Byerly’s Fever of
War specifically focuses on the impact of the epidemic on the American army
during the war. As a result, her analysis includes a detailed account of the failures
of the national government, health care professionals, and medical officers that
led to the worst epidemic on American soil.
The second and third chapters will focus on the non-pharmaceutical
interventions proposed by government and public health officials during the later
stages of the pandemic. In 1918, it was still unknown that influenza was caused
by a virus, and while vaccines had been created for certain viral diseases, there
was little concern for protection against influenza prior to the onset of the
pandemic. In the second chapter I will outline and define the use of
nonpharmaceutical interventions and examine the implementation of these
interventions across the United States in 1918. Howard Markel’s
epidemiological research through historical archives provides a great resource for

10

statistical data of non-pharmaceutical interventions nation-wide as well as trends
and graphs depicting the gradual spread of the epidemic. His collection of
material includes data collected from seven different cities that reported relatively
few (if any) cases of influenza and no more than one influenza death during the
second wave of the pandemic.10 Using Markel as a template for my research
methodology, I will be drawing from primary sources collected by the University
of Michigan Medical School’s Center for the History of Medicine. I will
therefore be evaluating measures that led to the success of these cities including
population size, geographic location, and the time at which nonpharmaceutical
interventions were implemented during the second-wave of the pandemic. I will
later come back to the use of nonpharmacutical interventions when evaluating the
pandemic preparedness plans in place for dealing with current threats of global
and national pandemics.
The third chapter will include detailed localized case studies of Princeton,
New Jersey, New York City, New York, and Syracuse, New York, and the
success and failures of these cities in controlling the spread of influenza through
the use of nonpharmaceutical interventions. I have chosen these cities based on
their variable size, location, and degree of success in preventing deaths from
influenza during the second wave of the pandemic. Each city shared a
commonality due to its proximity to either a port or military base and therefore
experienced similar challenges of protecting the civilian community from soldiers
potentially suffering from influenza. The collection of primary sources I will be
10
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referring to in the case study of Princeton, NJ was also part of The University of
Michigan’s digital influenza collection, of which excerpts from The Princeton
Packet have provided the best reference. The New York Times and The Syracuse
Herald have been the best primary sources for my analysis of New York City and
Syracuse, NY, which were obtained through the use of Syracuse University’s
digital newspaper archives.
Following the publication of Crosby’s study in 1976, there have been a
numerous other works published on the 1918 pandemic within the last 10 years.
However, prior to this time there was virtually no mention of the pandemic in
American history books nor were there extensive studies done with the
overwhelming amount of historical data present from 1918. Among college
students, most have more familiarity with the Black Plague of the fourteenth
century than they do with the “Spanish” flu, despite the latter occurring more
recently and more relevant to the history of America. In addition there have been
two other major flu epidemics since 1918, but neither one has stayed in the
memory of Americans - particularly virologists in science, and medical historians
in the social sciences - for long. In chapter four I will attempt to give an
explanation as to how the biological nature of the virus coupled with the events of
the war, made it so easy to forget the most devastating pandemic in recent history.
I will also briefly evaluate the coming and going of the two other twentieth
century influenza epidemics and how our perceptions of 1918 have changed since
their passing.
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Following my historical analysis of the 1918 epidemic, I will discuss why
this crisis has reemerged in national consciousness in the present decade. I will
connect this discussion to a scientific analysis of recent developments in virology.
Prior to 1997, without a complete eight gene sequence of the 1918 influenza virus
strain, we only had weak theories surrounding either mystery. However,
following the extremely difficult task of piecing together small RNA fragments
from tissues of human lungs embedded in the permafrost of Alaska, a killer virus
was recreated. In chapter five I will be explaining the recent scientific progress
made from the recreation of the 1918 influenza virus strain. I will draw from the
primary source papers that published the genetic sequence of the virus as well as
groundbreaking studies that have helped us to better understand the mechanisms
of viral infection.
Since the recreation of the virus numerous labs have been able to develop
studies based off of specific cellular and viral proteins that aid in the replication
and virulence of the influenza virus. Specifically, the Katze Lab in Seattle,
Washington has focused on the genomic and proteomic characterization of the
influenza virus as well as its contributions to virulence through studies on the
host-immune response following viral infection. This chapter will be a discussion
of two specific proteins I have studied over the last two years. The first protein,
NS1, is a highly conserved viral protein that is known to suppress the interferon
response in the host cell, which delays the immune response and allows the virus
to continue replicating without a counterattack from the organism’s immunes
system. Secondly, the cellular protein P58 is believed to be hijacked by the
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influenza virus to aid in viral replication by down-regulating the interferoninduced protein kinase, PKR, which regulates translation. This chapter will
include an overview of both protein functions and the potential of each protein’s
ability to aid in the replication of more virus and perhaps their contributions to
increased virulence. I will be drawing from papers previously published in the
Katze Lab as well unpublished data on the expression of P58, which was
generated this summer. Reexamining the ways in which the national government
handled the pandemic of 1918 could be valuable in formulating a modern day
government preparedness plan. In addition, connecting present day scientific
research with analyses of past historical events can serve as a model for future
interdisciplinary collaborations.
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Chapter 1
National Threat: The development of the United States Public Health
Service and the national response to pandemic influenza.

Prior to the outbreak of influenza in the United States, it appeared that the
United States Public Health Service was in control of health conditions in the
army and civilian populations. Army camps and local towns implemented
surveys on sanitary conditions, and it seemed the Public Health Service had an
adequate staff to carry out measures for improvements within their targeted areas.
However, while military physicians were confident in their ability to deal with
communicable diseases, it never occurred in their minds that there would be one
disease during the war that they would not be able to fix through cleanliness and
sanitation. As the influenza epidemic spread through the United States during the
second wave, the United States Public Health Service learned very quickly that it
lacked the tools required to fight this new epidemic, which included a strong
centralized presence, the ability to enforce quarantine measures within individual
states, and an adequate staff with proper resources.11
This chapter will focus on the early development of the influenza
epidemic in the United States and the response of the United States Public Health
Service as the disease spread throughout the nation. In 1918, the United States
Public Health Service was still in its infancy, and there had not been a clear
designation of authority between state, federal, civilian, and military personnel.
Consequently, there was little communication and designation of duty in regard to
containment zones, public relations, morbidity and mortality reports, and
11
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interpretation of data. This chapter will argue that the United States Public Health
Service failed to assert itself as the dominant authority during the pandemic,
which led to an unorganized response amongst public health officials on every
level.
Nearly a year prior to the onset of the influenza epidemic, the
Public Health Service was successfully taking active measures to reduce
communicable diseases in the army and in civilian populations. According to the
Assistant Surgeon General, John Trask, not only was the United States Public
Health Service (USPHS) protecting the health of the troops by providing them
with the best possible sanitary and health conditions, but it also improved
facilities on the Atlantic seaboard, “to meet any emergency which may arise in
connection with returning troop ships with communicable diseases.”12
Understanding how disease spread and that mobilizing troops for war contributed
to this potential risk, the leaders of the USPHS felt confident that they were taking
the proper active measures.
Besides improving sanitary conditions, the USPHS also
specifically targeted other communicable diseases it knew how to prevent. This
included supervising the fly nuisance, cleaning public water to prevent malaria,
issuing vaccines against smallpox and prophylactic inoculations against typhoid
fever.13 In regards to its relationship with the local and state boards of health, the
Public Health Service officials also felt confident in their ability to communicate
efficiently and cooperatively with the proper officials when needed. Surgeon
12
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General William Gorgas, best known for his success at combating yellow fever
and malaria, expressed his satisfaction with the achievements in the health of the
army and was confident these improvements could be extended to the nation as a
whole.14
However, neither sanitation nor pharmaceutical interventions would
provide the Public Health Service with enough weaponry to fight the invading
influenza epidemic they would face in the summer. In addition, the USPHS was
focused on the damaging effects the war had on the civilian populations and their
doctors. As Trask noted, “There is danger that a considerable proportion of our
all too few trained doctors will leave their work to join the fighting forces without
having trained others to do their work in city and state health departments.15”
While during the war many physicians felt obligated to fulfill their patriotic duty
by serving the troops, they were also abandoning their practices at home without
leaving an adequate replacement. The stretching of resources would result in a
serious problem as the country was hit in full force by the epidemic.
Even with the right resources, the United States Public Health
Service was not organized properly to provide the best communication and health
care delivery needed during a crisis. In 1918, both influenza and tuberculosis
were diseases that were not considered significantly reportable and therefore,
unless a doctor deemed it appropriate, they were not forced to report cases of
influenza in their communities. In Philadelphia alone, among the approximately
80 hospitals located in the city, only 23 of them provided detailed statements of
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both the morbidity and mortality statistics in their hospital. However, even
among these 23 hospitals no two were comparable.16 Boston faced similar
problems of its own, as state commissioner Eugene Kelly and epidemiologist
B.W. Carey noted in their report. According to Kelly and Carey, “The earliest
and most striking feature that came to our attention in planning our campaign for
combating the pandemic of influenza … was the absence of uniform methods of
organization in the various health agencies upon whom we were obliged to
rely.”17 In their report, Kelly and Carey believed that the proper method of
fighting the pandemic influenza was to have a strong localized board to issue
uniformed tasks throughout the state and local governments, which Boston was
then lacking. Therefore, without adequate local boards of health in some of the
major cities, it would have been unlikely to expect anything different at the state
and local level.
As the nation went to war, citizens witnessed and became accustomed to
the rapid expansion of the federal government. With the war occurring at the
latter phase of the Progressive Era (1890-1920), American citizens not only
wanted, but expected a more professional and centralized national administration.
In health care, public officials and reformers assembled only partially effective
government institutions through a blend of both public and private establishments
to smooth out increasing problems generated by industrialization, immigration,
and urbanization. Late in the nineteenth-century, medical and government
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officials became more active in public health related topics and assumed greater
medical responsibility for sicknesses connected with poverty and deprivation.18
In addition, progressivism accelerated the professionalization of the medical and
nursing professions and produced a range of medical institutions such as state and
local government health departments, health insurance programs, and hospitals.19
However, war mobilization and the onset of the influenza pandemic would make
it clear there were still problems within the health care system. Although there
was an increase in centralized government and health care support, there was no
standardized system of hierarchy between state and federal health departments.
In its relationship to the local health boards, there was little the United
States Public Heath Service could do to improve their conditions. On August 9,
1918, before the influenza epidemic had reached the Atlantic coast, the U.S. Navy
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery in Washington, D.C., issued a bulletin warning
that influenza was prevalent throughout Europe, Hawaii, and elsewhere. Seven
days following this report, the Surgeon General of the United States Public Health
Service ordered the medical officers in charge of quarantines around various ports
to be on alert for influenza on European vessels and to hold ships with flu patients
on board until the local health authorities were notified.20 Other than this, there
was not much more that the Public Health Service could do to prevent the spread
of influenza since federal authorities did not have the legal power to quarantine
areas governed by the states. Due to World War I, even if the Public Health
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Service had the authority to implement these quarantines within the states, it
would have been highly unlikely that they would have received approval from the
federal government. A strict maritime quarantine would have reduced the flow of
troops and supplies to the Western front, delaying the pace of the war and leaving
the Central Powers with the greater advantage.21
While it did not have the right on its own to step in and interfere
with the sanitary work of the states, the United States Public Health Service could
be authorized to cooperate and assist state departments. This included
appropriating money to establish hospitals and sanitariums and awarding grants to
aid in state health administration. These grants could act as tools for the federal
government to monitor state regulations by requiring certain standards that
warranted federal inspections. Furthermore, during wartime, the health powers
of the United States could be extended beyond state lines to protect the health of
soldiers. However, as then Johns Hopkins University president Frank J.
Goodnow observed, these extended powers were usually “infrequently exercised
and consequently have little permanent influence.”22 This was especially the case

21
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in 1918, as little priority was initially given to public health concerns of
containment both within and outside the army. In 1919, Goodnow had high hopes
that a greater national interest would eventually improve communication among
health departments, as the influenza pandemic demonstrated public health
concerns must be more than a local responsibility. He called for a keener
realization that “epidemics are not respecters of state or even national lines,” and
proposed “a broader interpretation of existing powers [that] may well result in
constitutional amendment.”23 However, it will be discussed in a later chapter that
the federal government and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
currently still stood by the original interpretation.
In addition to conflicts between state and local boards of health, medical
officers in the military assumed two roles during the war, which included serving
the government as well as caring for their patients. This combination of military
authority and public health powers of vaccination and quarantine allowed the
Medical Department to function as an integral agency within the military.
Unfortunately, these two roles were not always compatible, and often difficult for
civilian trained physicians to balance.
As the United States became more involved with the war, the Medical
Corps began to face a dilemma to problems of untrained soldiers in the military.
As more troops were needed overseas, there was an increase in the mobilization
of raw untrained male civilians who were hurried into their transformation into
effective soldiers. Likewise, the Medical Corps would bring into service large
numbers of untrained civilian doctors who were not prepared to do all that was
23
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required of a military surgeon. Surgeon General Gorgas not only understood this
problem, but also knew that the larger number of men called for duty meant that
there would be greater difficulties in maintaining their health, especially during
the first year when volunteers suffered a higher rate of disease than regulars.24
For civilian doctors, not only was there an overwhelming responsibility to care for
these soldiers, but they were also expected to treat as a mass entity rather than
collective individuals. Therefore, the Medical Department was responsible
primarily for the corporate health of the army as a whole, and secondarily the
health of individual soldiers.25 For many new military medical officers, this
approach was a sharp contrast with the individual focus of private practice, with
which they were familiar.
The first priority of medical officials was to “preserve the strength of the
Army in the field,” and therefore proper preventative health care was not always
closely followed. With the final authority resting in the hands of non-medical
military personnel, advice on quarantine, personal hygiene, and problems of
overcrowding were not always adequately addressed during stressful wartime.26
Toward the end of September, as the pandemic raged throughout
the country, the USPHS continued to sit back on its hands, doing little to provide
the public with comfort, aid, or solutions. Issuing a bulletin in early October,
Surgeon General Rupert Blue finally tried to take a proactive measure by firmly
recommending a quarantine policy across the whole country by dispatching
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telegrams to all state health officials. The extent of these telegrams recommended
each official to close all public gatherings in communities threatened by the
epidemic to help control the spread of disease. The next day hundreds of
communities listened up and acted on the Surgeon General’s request.
Unfortunately for cities such as Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and St. Louis,
this warning came a little too late.27 Towards the height of the pandemic, Rupert
Blue tried to fend against how little he had done to protect the nation. Through
public announcements he tried to advise the public on ways to avoid influenza,
but his information was often general and provided little comfort. Some of the
reassuring suggestions Blue offered to the public included avoiding needless
crowding, smothering sneezes, and, “when the air is pure breathe all of it you can
– breathe deeply.”28 For a nation suffering from death and dying at home and
abroad, needless advice did not help ease their fears of the war or of the pandemic
(Figure 1).
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While there was a greater expectation for the government to support
American citizens at home and abroad during the war, this responsibility was not
unidirectional. An increase in government control and expansion became a
“social contract” with American citizens who had increasing expectations. Since
a democratic republic cannot effectively enter a war without its citizens’ consent
to finance and serve in the military, the federal government had an important role
on the home front to maintain support for the war with the general public. Every
element of the nation at home mattered, which meant the government saw control
of information as necessary to sustain public moral.29
Advertising was about to emerge as an industry, and President Woodrow
Wilson would take full advantage of this to shape public opinion of the war. As
the first president to address the International Congress of Salesmanship in 1916,
he urged its members to “go out and sell goods that will make the world more
comfortable and more happy, and convert them to the principles of America.”30
Establishing the Committee on Public Information the following year with former
journalist George Creel as chairman, they set up a massive advertising campaign
in the name of foreign policy. Known as the Creel Committee, its purpose was to
address the problem of censorship and solicit the public’s participation and
understanding of the war effort.31 To do this, Creel used tens of thousands of
press releases that were routinely run unedited by newspapers that instituted a
self-censorship.
29
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Originally, Creel only intended to report facts (although carefully
selected), and only conduct a positive campaign absent of the use of fear tactics.
Creel himself wrote, “We believe passionately in the purity of our motives…and
we felt that in order to win unity, in order to gain the verdict of mankind, all we
had to do was to give facts in the interest of full understanding.”32 However this
attitude did not last long as Creel began to demand “100% Americanism,” and
increased pressure for American citizens to not only support the war effort, but to
contribute financially. One example was a poster aimed at selling Liberty Bonds
that warned, “I am Public Opinion. All men fear me! … [I]f you have the money
to buy and do not buy, I will make this No Man’s Land for you!”33 The U.S.
government supported these efforts as they called upon its citizens to pay
increased taxes and buy war bonds. Wilson in return promised a war to save
democracy and assured Americans that the army would take good care of their
soldiers by provided them with benefits and the best medical care possible.34
However he gave no reservation as he also demanded during a liberty loan drive
for “Force! Force to the utmost! Force without stint or limit! The righteous and
triumphant Force which shall make Right the law of the world, and cast every
selfish dominion down the down in the dust.”35 This type of vigor would
indirectly enhance the attack of influenza, as it mobilized citizens to travel around
the country to spy and attack anyone criticizing the war (Figure 2).

32

George Creel, “Public Opinion in Wartime,” Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 78, Mobilizing America’s Resources for the War (1918): 185-194.
33
Quoted in: Barry, 127.
34
Byerly, 43.
35
Quoted in: Barry, 128.

25

During a time when proper quarantine measures should have been
addressed, the selling and buying of Liberty Bonds put many citizens at risk. In
addition, these resources could have been better spent aiding organizations like
the Red Cross, which worked tirelessly to provide medical treatment to those at
home and abroad. The reparations of the liberty loan drives would come full
force in Philadelphia, where the campaign would raise millions of dollars, but at a
severe price for its citizens. Despite reports of influenza sweeping through
Philadelphia naval installations, and warnings from Boston and the Great Lakes,
where the pandemic had already devastated civilian populations, Wilmer Krusen,
director of the city’s Department of Public Health and Charities, declined to issue
a quarantine for the city. He defended his decision because there had not been
any cases in the civilian population.
As Crosby writes in his chapter on the pandemic in Philadelphia, “If
forewarned had really meant forearmed in 1918, then Philadelphia would have
come through the pandemic with little damage.”36 Prior to the outbreak in
Philadelphia, Boston had already seen the worst of the pandemic. Within just two
36
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weeks of the first appearance of influenza, two thousand officers and men of the
First Naval District had contracted influenza. To make matters worse, city
officials in Boston were caught off guard when three civilians died from influenza
in early September, providing the fearful evidence that the epidemic had officially
moved from the confines of the military to the general public. Before the month
would end, the city would see over 1,000 civilian deaths.37 Therefore, there was a
likely probability that the appearance of influenza in the Philadelphia Naval Yard
on September 11 would spread to the civilian population in Philadelphia.
However, even knowing the consequences of the epidemic in Boston, director of
the Department of Health and Charities Wilmer Krusen informed the public that
there was little chance the epidemic would spread widely among Philadelphia’s
civilians.38
This lack of acknowledgement, coupled with the pressure to continue on
with patriotic duties in support of the war, would lead to one of the greatest
blunders of the pandemic. As the cases of influenza rose past 600 at
Philadelphia’s naval yard, the Bureau of Health become a little more concerned
and finally made influenza a reportable disease. However, on the same day, Dr.
Paul Lewis isolated what they believed was the cause of influenza, Pfeiffer’s
bacillus. Believing this was the cure all for the pandemic, officials saw no reason
to cancel the fourth Liberty Loan drive to raise more money in support of the war.
On September 28, over 200,000 gathered to watch the parade span 23 blocks
through the city (Figure 3). Similar parades across the nation continued in the
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midst of the epidemic, including Chicago and New York.39 However, in the days
following the parade in Philadelphia, the pandemic exploded full force within the
city. Three days after the parade, 635 new civilian cases were reported in a single
day and over 10,000 deaths would be reported in the month of October alone.40

As the cases of influenza rose in Philadelphia, city officials faced a
problem synonymous with every major city nationwide. Caught up in the idea of
patriotism and opportunities for career advancement, an overwhelming amount of
the country’s doctors had already joined the war. Rupert Blue noted that “the
practices of emergency surgery are being tried out on a scale so vast as to baffle
the imagination,” as he admired the amount of physicians curious about
participating in the war.41 With so many doctors and nurses doing their duty to
support of the war overseas, there were not enough resources on the home front to
handle the mass casualties of the pandemic. Twenty-six percent of Philadelphia’s
39
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3,500 physicians were serving in the military, leaving the remaining doctors and
nurses overworked and short staffed. The city health authorities appealed for the
assistance of additional physicians and nurses, but because every other city was
facing the same problem, there was no one that could be sent.42
In addition, although it was known that there were deaths widespread
throughout the city, there was no communicating the morbidity and mortality
statistics of the disease outbreak amongst the various hospitals. As Dr. Scott
Miller of Philadelphia’s Bureau of Public Health noted, “While the vital statistics
showed the disease to be widespread in character, it became a question of local
interest whether one particular part of the city was affected more than another …
No one was able to answer these queries. As a result, preventive and educational
work could not be concentrated and data of general character was distributed to
all classes in all sections of the city.”43 Within the Bureau of Public Health there
was no organization for effective communication at the local level. Similarly this
pattern of organization continued up to the federal government, allowing for the
pandemic to go unchecked throughout many areas of the country.
Rupert Blue and the United States Public Health Service did a lot wrong
and a little right during the influenza crisis. However, one success of Blue’s stint
as the Surgeon General included organizing the “Home Defense Nurses” to take
care of the general public. These nurses were fully professional, but unable to
serve in the military due to age, disability, or marriage. In addition, through the
help of Frank Persons and the Red Cross, they were able to organize relief and
42
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divide the labor amongst the organizations.44 While most of these measures
ended up being too little and too late, it did save Rupert Blue’s career as the
Surgeon General from being a complete disaster.
However, with the lack of a true centralized presence and a plan to
organize a uniform method of delivering aid, the responsibility of organizing
relief efforts and quarantines was left to the local and state boards. Of those
doctors left to take care of the civilian population, there was very little they could
have done to relieve the spread of disease. Many did what they could to work
around the clock to produce a saving vaccine to end the Spanish influenza. Dr.
C.Y. White of Philadelphia was one of the physicians who believed he had
produced the “miracle” vaccine, which was distributed free to hundreds of doctors
who immediately inoculated thousands of Philadelphians.45 However, in 1918, it
was not known that influenza was even caused by a virus and Dr. Paul Lewis had
originally misdiagnosed it as a bacteria. These vaccines ended up being only a
mix of filtered blood and mucus of flu patients that at best did nothing and at
worst helped aid in the spread of the pandemic. 46 While valuable time and
resources were spent trying to find a cure for the disease, the virus was continuing
to spread across the country. However, not every city suffered as badly as others,
and those that managed to reduce the mortality rate did so through the use of
prevention and quarantine. These next two chapters will look at the non-
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pharmaceutical interventions used by these cities and to what extent these
practices were effective in preventing the spread of disease.
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Chapter 2
Implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions
Despite achievements in medical research and practice, in 1918 the
influenza virus still mystified medical researchers in their attempts to produce an
effective vaccine. It would be another twelve years before the first virus would be
viewed underneath an electron microscope and at this time influenza was still
considered to be caused by a bacterial agent. Therefore, with limited medical
resources, the primary defense outlined by the United States Public Health
Service focused on non-pharmaceutical interventions rather than clinical
treatment. Here, non-pharmaceutical interventions are defined as measures used
for prevention and control that do not require pharmaceuticals such as vaccines or
antiviral medications. These methods can be classified into further categories that
involve limiting the international spread of the virus, reducing the spread in local
and national populations, reducing the individual person’s risk for infection, and
communicating the risks and educating the public.47 For the purposes of this
paper, I will limit my definition to interventions used to prevent the spread the
influenza in the United States at the local and national levels. Classifying these
interventions into three categories I will specifically focus on school closings,
cancellation of public gatherings, and isolation and quarantine measures.48
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Non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) are intended to reduce infectious
contacts between persons during outbreaks of disease. Although it is improbable
to expect these interventions to prevent a pandemic, theoretical modeling research
has suggested that non-pharmaceutical interventions might play a role in delaying
the effect of the outbreak by reducing the overall peak and attack rate and
reducing the number of cumulative deaths. 49 These measures could provide
valuable time for an effective vaccine to be widely distributed, decreasing the
burden placed on health care services. The 1918 influenza pandemic represents
one of the largest recorded events with the use of NPIs to alleviate the spread of a
highly virulent influenza virus strain. It provides a useful tool, therefore, for
understanding the effectiveness of NPIs nationwide, allowing experts to evaluate
the effectiveness of these interventions for future pandemic preparedness.50
Nationally, the use of non-pharmaceutical interventions was limited as the
federal government did not have the authority to control the spread of the
epidemic within the individual states where it would have been the most effective.
Similar to problems faced by the army when the war broke out, the USPHS health
officials were not ready for the job which they were expected to do. The first
major problem of controlling the pandemic was similar to what Philadelphia had
faced on a local scale. The USPHS had no way of accessing information on the
latest progress of the pandemic and therefore could not distribute forces
efficiently to the places that needed them the most. In addition, at the beginning
49
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of the second wave, although the number of influenza deaths began to rise, there
was still censorship and inaccurate reporting of influenza in the newspapers. This
created more confusion and fear among health officials and laypeople. Instead of
using reporting to its advantage in limiting the amount of contacts among
infectious people, posters and pamphlets that were generated provided little
comfort and no effective advice.51
Within the army, Surgeon General Rupert Blue made strict
recommendations to limit the clustering of “crowds” within the military
encampments. The incident at Camp Devens on September 26 raised concern for
both military and local health officials, when the disease officially spread to
civilian populations. Accordingly Blue issued a report that camp commanders
were not authorized to transfer “contacts” of any communicable disease.
Unfortunately this notice came too late as there were 18 camps across the country
that were heavily infected by the end of September, 1918. In addition, to mitigate
the outbreaks of influenza already present in the 16 camps, Blue suggested that
the degree of crowding among the infected individuals should be reduced by
giving each man a minimum of 50 square feet of floor space in barracks or tents
(Figure 4).52
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The warnings issued by Blue did not come soon enough. Whether the use
of NPIs occurred in the military or civilian populations, the success at which they
were effective would depend largely of the combination of the NPIs used and the
timing of implementation. In civilian populations, officials who issued quarantine
measures prior to reaching the peak of the pandemic within their city were more
effective at reducing the number of deaths. Therefore, if being held to the same
standards of analyses, the military’s use of NPIs was not effective enough to
reduce the level of casualties in the camps. By the time Rupert Blue issued any
use of non-pharmaceutical interventions, there were 16 military camps suffering
severely from disease. Although Blue claimed these camps followed orders, there
were not enough military officials to monitor these camps and ensure that Blue’s
orders were carried out effectively. Influenza is not easy to diagnose, and with
thousands of soldiers transferred from one camp to another there would have been
a relatively high probability that some were carrying the disease with them.53
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With influenza prevalent in so many military camps, the next concern
among military officials was to prevent the disease from spreading to civilian
populations. Although Camp Devens in Boston had been struck by surprise, the
others had prior warnings of this highly virulent form of influenza. Military
officials were aware that if it were to spread to civilian populations outside their
camps, they would be facing an uncontrollable catastrophe. Due to the strict
guidelines of military and civilian authority, once the virus spread outside the
confines of the military, the authority for containment would be left in the hands
of the local governments. Knowing this Rupert Blue did issue a pamphlet
“Spanish Influenza,” “Three-Day Fever,” “The Flu,” which provided advice on
general NPIs civilians could practice to guard themselves against influenza
(Figure 5). Perhaps the only useful advice provided was to limit overcrowding
whenever possible. Of less help, he advised, “In short make every possible effort
to breathe as much pure air as possible,” ending with the rhyme “Cover up each
cough and sneeze, if you don’t you’ll spread disease.”54 Unfortunately, these
recommendations had little effect on the prevention of disease and did not provide
individuals with the comfort they were looking for.
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In early October, Blue’s telegram recommending quarantines of infected
areas was sent to thousands of communities. However, some authorities took
advantage of this message and followed his recommendations while others did
not. The editorial writer of the Philadelphia Inquirer saw little use of Blue’s
advice, writing, “It is difficult to understand what is to be gained by shutting up
well ventilated churches and theaters. The authorities seem to be going daft.
What are they trying to do, scare everybody to death?”55 Similarly, Crosby
argues such closings recommended by Blue in reality “did little to limit the spread
of flu in Philadelphia, Washington, St. Louis, or any of the other large cities
where it was tried.”56 However, this was not the case in every major city. For
example, Howard Markel argues that New York City successfully limited the
number of influenza deaths with the use of NPIs, primarily through enforcement
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of isolation and quarantine procedures.57 However, they were not completely free
from mistakes as these measures were lifted prior to the end of the influenza
epidemic, which led an increase in the number of unavoidable deaths.58 In
addition, although some city officials did not officially implement quarantine
measures, some citizens chose to voluntarily participate. For example, in Chicago
the highest percentage of absentees occurred on approximately October 21, four
days later than the date of the greatest incidence of disease in the city. A survey
conducted by the division of child hygiene showed that only a partial percent of
these absences were from illness and much more were due to either the illness or
death of a family member or because the parent voluntarily chose to keep their
child from school to prevent them from contracting the disease.59 Perhaps if
specific advice on avoiding schools and public places was more widely
distributed from the surgeon general to laymen in these larger cities, they would
have been able to make their own decisions similar to those made by the parents
of Chicago children. Besides these larger cities there were also those of medium
size that fared better than others in reducing the number of influenza cases
partially due to their use of non-pharmaceutical interventions.
In some cities, in particular San Francisco, citizens took it upon
themselves to reduce the spread of influenza. Going above the requirements
recommended by Blue, public health director William Hassler shut down the
57

Markel, “Nonpharmaceutical Interventions Implemented by US Cities.”
A more in depth criticism of the non-pharmaceutical interventions in New York City will be
provided in the case study in chapter three.
59
“Report of an Epidemic of Influenza in Chicago Occurring During the Fall of 1918,” accessed
through Models of Infectious Disease Agent Study.
https://www.epimodels.org/midas/catdoc.do?methodToCall=view&catalogDocId=594&mode=vie
w
58

38

entire city for the second wave of the epidemic, by issuing quarantines on all
naval institutions prior to any reported cases within them or the city. Unlike the
Philadelphia reporter who believed quarantine measures would instigate fear,
Hassler recruited hundreds of volunteers to help keep medical supplies stocked
and distribute masks to thousands of citizens. Since they had something
productive to do, the people of San Francisco were informed and in control of the
influenza epidemic. They understood the danger and were assigned specific
tasks. Building off the ideology of patriotism for the war, Hassler was able to
create an active community that was not paralyzed by the fear of a potential
pandemic.60 To Hassler’s advantage, he also had the benefit of receiving a clear
warning that the pandemic was on its way. This allowed congress to vote on a
one-million dollar appropriation to fight the flu before the first deaths reached the
city.61
In 2005, the Center for the History of Medicine at the University of
Michigan Medical School conducted a study on American communities that had
experienced very low rates of influenza during the 1918 pandemic. San Francisco
was among these communities. Others included Gunnison, Colorado, Princeton,
New Jersey, Western Pennsylvania Institute for the Blind, Trudeau Tuberculosis
Sanatorium, Bryn Marr College, and Fletcher, Vermont. A team of historians
visited these communities to locate and collect available primary source material,
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and created an extensive influenza digital archive.62 A report published by
Howard Markel and colleges provided an in depth analysis of these seven
communities, which were not only chosen because of their low death rates (zero
to one) during the second wave of the influenza pandemic, but also because of, to
some degree, their use of non-pharmaceutical interventions.63
Conclusions from this study showed that the use of NPIs could have
played a role in reducing the fatalities during the pandemic, but other factors may
also have contributed the success of these communities. These factors included
population density, the patterns of infected individuals within the community, and
geographic location. Communities isolated from military bases and frequent
travelers faired a better chance of avoiding the spread of the disease. In addition
the seven communities studied by Markel and colleagues were all relatively small
in size making it easier for public health officials to maintain order and issue
quarantine measures. In addition, the study concluded that political and legal
authority needed to be transparent with harmonious corporation between state and
federal health officials. Markel and colleges stated, “Internecine rivalries or
disagreements between local, state, and federal agencies have a strong potential to
detract from pandemic influenza prevention and containment.”64 Drastic
differences between the outcomes of Philadelphia and San Francisco provides one
of the best examples of how important communication is from the different
62

“Influenza Digital Archive: The 1918-1920 Influenza Pandemic Escape Community Digital
Document Archive,” The Center for the History of Medicine, University of Michigan Medical
School. http://www.med.umich.edu/medschool/chm/influenza/
63
Markel, “A Historical Assessment of Non-pharmaceutical Disease Containment Strategies
Employed by Selected U.S. Communities During the Second Wave of the 1918-1920 Influenza
Pandemic.”
64
Ibid.

40

branches of public health. Consequently, it is difficult to provide a precise
blueprint for pandemic influenza planning on historical evidence alone, due to the
varying factors that contributed to differences among communities during the
pandemic.
One particular flaw of Markel’s data is that the communities he observed
were all relatively small in size and therefore it is difficult to deduce the effect
NPIs would have on a city of a larger size. In the following chapter I will use
Howard Markel’s research design methods outlined in this study and apply them
to three different case studies of communities that varied in size and location.
The first of these cities is Princeton, NJ, which was among the communities
Markel and colleagues selected as being successful at protecting its citizens
against influenza. I will also be focusing on New York City, which as a large port
city was at a higher risk of being hit by the influenza pandemic. Third, I will
focus my research on the local response in Syracuse, NY. As a medium sized city
in 1918, Syracuse did not have the same advantages of isolation as Princeton, NJ,
but also was not a port city like New York City and therefore received some
protection. Each of these cities also had a military base nearby and were chosen
because of similar risks faced from mobilized troops spreading diseases from one
camp to another.
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Chapter 3
Non-pharmaceutical Interventions: A case study of Syracuse, NY,
Princeton NJ, and New York, New York.
The awkward communication among the state, local, military, and civilian
health departments greatly hindered the prevention of the spread of the pandemic.
Not surprisingly, due to the lack of communication between various rankings of
public health authorities, there was not a consistent response or outcome of the
pandemic in each city across the United States. In addition, varying sizes and
geographic locations also played a role in helping or hindering communication
between public health officials and the general public. The effectiveness of nonpharmaceutical interventions implemented by the local authorities was dependent
on a number of these factors along with the degree of military involvement and
mobilization surrounding these communities. This chapter, therefore, provides a
case study of Princeton, NJ, New York City, NY, and Syracuse, NY, three
different communities that varied in size, geographic location, and outcome of
influenza cases during the second wave of the 1918 pandemic. Building from the
study done by Howard Markel, this case study does not only look at those cities
that were successful, but also ones that faced problems in maintaining their
isolation during the pandemic.
The Success at Princeton
At the height of the pandemic, Princeton University remained secluded
with the protection of a small suburban town in Central New Jersey. With a
university of 1,142 men, the small community of Princeton, New Jersey was not
significantly larger, with an approximate total population of 5,700. At the time of
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the pandemic this community would not only benefit from the little dependence it
had on commerce and manufacturing, but through its strong connections to the
university. Similar to other universities throughout the country, in 1918,
Princeton University was being temporarily used as a training camp for U.S.
military troops being sent overseas. With hundreds of men being shipped in and
out of the university, the training camp became a potential threat for many.
However, Princeton utilized the military structure to its advantage, and was able
to implement strict non-pharmaceutical interventions and policies in the
community and at the university that would have been difficult without the strong
military presence.65
In 1918, an overwhelming (roughly 92 percent) number of students at
Princeton University entered into the various branches of the military including
the Army, Navy, Aeronautical, and Paymaster’s school. Of these students, 706
were included in the Student Army Training Corps (SATC), and 341 in the
Student Navy Training Corps (STNC). Only the students enrolled in the graduate
program, under the age of 18, or physically disqualified did not belong to the
program.66 Therefore, upon the start of a new semester, Princeton was able to
adopt a new army plan where “the members of the corps would lead a strict
military life.67” With most of the students participating in military activities,
every aspect of their life was regulated, from physical exams to the food they ate
in the mess halls.
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Also beneficial to the town of Princeton, the Student Army Training Corps
and the Student Navy Training Corps were essentially divided in their daily
activities and in the classroom. As a result, they were theoretically geographically
isolated from each other and therefore, in the event of an influenza outbreak, they
already had a system in place to prevent a rapid spread throughout the university.
This theory of isolation would be tested with the first cases of influenza appearing
on September 5, 1918 in the Navy Paymaster’s School. Immediately isolating
anyone showing symptoms of an upper respiratory problem, the university proved
its isolation measures were successful with only five cases appearing during the
month of September. Their abilities to continue this success would be tested
further in the beginning of October with the arrival of 200 new soldiers from
Naval Training Camp at Pelham Bay Park in New York, a camp that experienced
high influenza and mortality rates during the pandemic. To prevent the spread of
influenza among these men, each person was examined for symptoms of influenza
and they all were given a nasopharygeal spray consisting of chlorazene solution
and menthol.68
In addition to the strict inspections of the men arriving from New York,
greater regulations on daily activities were enforced throughout the entire
university. An article in the Princeton Packet announced on September 27 that
the university would be placed under local government control, abiding by the
same rules as West Point and Annapolis. Among the changes to the university,
newly enrolled students were expected to submit themselves to a physical exam.
Travel off university campus would be limited, wardrobes would be provided to
68
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the students by the university, and room decorations would be restricted and
monitored. In essence, while they were under the control of the United States
Navy and War Departments, “every phase of the college life will be under
military discipline.”69
Shortly after the governmental take over of the university, these nonpharmaceutical interventions were also extended to the Princeton community.
With the first death occurring in Princeton from the “Spanish Influenza” on
October 3, the reality of the epidemic hit the town immediately.70 The following
day, panic instilled as the town published a series of precautionary measures in
the Princeton Packet, issuing a closure of public gatherings and schools.
Churches, motion picture houses, bowling alleys, billiards and poolrooms as well
as several other places were now deemed a danger to the public health of the city.
Considering these measures advisable primarily as a formality, the Board of
Health was specifically clear that these precautions were not due to any unusual
sickness present at the time being. However, their urgency in maintaining these
quarantines was clear as “the new board has been given unlimited authority to
enforce all federal and state sanitary codes, and to regulation of conditions
through the town. Should any public places violate the rules, they will be dealt
with in the most severe manner.”71 While hoping to implement these new
quarantine regulations without an increase in public alarm, the Board of Health
was also aware of the seriousness involved with the first death from influenza.
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As the influenza epidemic escalated through the university and in the
town, further measures had to be enacted by the Board of Public Health to ensure
that isolation and quarantine regulations were abided by. Succeeding where
Philadelphia did not, the Board of Health was able to postpone its fourth liberty
loan drive for fear of contributing to a larger influenza outbreak.72 Nevertheless,
Princeton would not allow the influenza epidemic to handicap its bond buying
efforts as it found other means to promote wartime patriotism. Mainly through
the use of local boy scouts, bonds were sold door to door instead of during the
parade.73 While still allowing for the potential spread of influenza, door to door
interactions between the boy scouts and homeowners still provided a safer method
of selling and collecting bonds than allowing for thousands to crowd the streets
during the parade. Implementing a similar style, the Red Cross also chose to
extend door to door efforts in hopes of collecting more linen for the troops
stationed in France.74 With the closure of churches, schools, and movie theaters,
it became increasingly difficult to gain news and raise efforts to support the men
overseas. Therefore, creative measures were used to keep up wartime morale on
the home front.
As the outbreak spread, maintaining and forcing quarantine measures
became increasingly difficult at the university with an anxious student body. As a
part of preserving order and discipline, guards were placed on campus. To ensure
that no student left the university unaccounted for, lines of sentries surrounded the
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dormitories preventing anyone from coming or going without the proper pass. As
an article in the Princeton Packet describes, “the campus had changed from a free
and easy place, within which the night owl might roam, into a well policed
camp.”75 However, the extent to which these new sentinels were able to enforce
quarantine mandates is debatable. Consisting largely of freshman, and only
distinguishable from other students with a patch on their arm, these sentinels were
faced with the difficult task of maintaining authority amongst upper class students
entwined in school tradition and customs. During one such occurrence, a
freshman tried to prevent an upperclassman from entering certain quarters
upperclassmen had been traditionally given for years. Not allowing himself to be
subjected to the authority of someone he deemed inferior, the upperclassman
refused to abide by the rules of the freshmen sentinel and continued on his way.
Without any way of forcing the comings and goings of students other than their
mere presence, other young sentries faced similar experiences with similar
outcomes.76 In essence the purpose of these guards served more as an image of
security rather than as a means of actually providing the students with feelings of
heightened safety.
Despite the misgivings of the security and the potential spread of influenza
that the door to door bond selling may have caused, Princeton was able to dodge a
bullet unlike many other towns and cities in the nation. After nearly a full month
of quarantine the Board of Health officially lifted its hold in Princeton on
November 3. Due in part to the measures they implemented, there were only 68
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cases of influenza and no deaths among the SATC cadets during the second wave
of the pandemic. On the university, only one death was recorded of a faculty
member who died of pneumonia. Throughout the town, there were a total of 32
deaths, showing quite favorably that measures taken by the Board of Health in
Princeton may have contributed to their success in avoiding a crisis.77
In addition to the use of proper non-pharmaceutical interventions, the size
and location of Princeton may have also contributed to their successes. Had
Princeton been a larger university, keeping track of and controlling the daily
movements of the students and cadets would have been more difficult. For
instance, the University of Michigan, home of the largest SATC organization in
the United States at the time, suffered from 1,207 cases of influenza in their
2,270-member SATC.78 Larger cities such as Boston, New York, and
Philadelphia also suffered more deaths due to the epidemic. In some cases these
deaths may have been unavoidable with the constant trading and traveling
amongst these larger cities. However, in some cases the use of nonpharmaceutical interventions was almost nonexistent in the heavily populated
cities. Therefore, while the success of Princeton may have been hard to duplicate,
the disaster that occurred in New York City may have also been avoidable had
health officials modified Princeton’s methods to accommodate for the size and
location of New York.
Outbreak of Influenza in New York City
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Facing thirty-three thousand deaths, New York City was hit extremely
hard in the early stages of the second wave of the pandemic. With little warning
and limited advice on successful defenses for this new epidemic, city officials
were caught off guard. Despite the reputation as the best municipal public heath
department in the world, the New York City Department of Public Health failed
to acknowledge the influenza warnings from abroad as a potential threat to the
safety of the city. Faced with political conflicts both internally and externally,
proper quarantine measures such as those in Princeton, NJ were not enacted in
New York City until the influenza epidemic had already escalated beyond the
control of the board of public health.79,80
Prior to the epidemic in 1918, the New York City Department of Public
Health had demonstrated its ability to successfully implement quarantine
measures within the city. Initially a priority in 1866, with the onset of the third
cholera epidemic of the nineteenth century, the Board of Health demonstrated its
ability to activate quarantines and initiate measures to ensure a cleaner city.81 A
decade prior to the influenza epidemic, the Board repeated these measures to
protect against two polio epidemics.82 In 1918, however, the success of evading
diseases through prevention was forgotten as wartime politics interfered with
science. Through ties of loyalty rather than qualifications, Royal Copeland, who
was not an M.D., was appointed as the commissioner of health in 1918. Failing to
notice the influenza as the primary bronchial disease contributing to the epidemic
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in 1918, Copeland proved his ignorance by refusing to do anything to prevent the
spread.83
Copeland’s first mistake as health commissioner came when he neglected
to recognize the arrival of the Norwegian freighter, Bergensfjord, as a potential
threat to the health of the city of New York. Carrying a crew of over 200 people
sick with disease, ambulances transported many members to nearby hospitals for
treatment.84 In a report to the New York Times eight days later, Copeland
concealed the potential threat of influenza with claims that outbreaks were caused
by a bronchial form of pneumonia, and what cases did appear to be caused by the
Spanish influenza were mild and therefore no alarm was needed.85 Failing to
notice a freighter filled with influenza victims became Copeland’s first mistake in
dooming the city to an epidemic. His second was the refusal to take active
measures once it became apparent that his first judgment and actions went
horribly wrong.
It was only a matter of time until the influenza virus spread from the ship’s
crew to the people of New York City. Shortly after Copeland’s announcement
reassuring the people that the influenza epidemic was a “mild form,” over 100
new cases of influenza were reported within the city. In an attempt to mask the
real problem, Copeland remained optimistic with the success of the Board of
Health to document and report all new cases. Copeland chose to direct his focus
toward isolating the “bacillus” for vaccine purposes, rather than working with
officials to prevent the current epidemic from raging through the city. With his
83
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main priority aimed at keeping public morale, he refused to close the schools
during this crucial period of needed quarantine.86

Eleven days following

Copeland’s decision, the New York Times published another report on the
conflicting interests of Copeland and former health commissioner and director of
Mt. Sinai Hospital, Dr. S. S. Goldwater. Goldwater, seeing the effects of the
epidemic first hand within the walls of Mt. Sinai, issued a public statement
warning that the conditions of the epidemic were far worse than what was being
reported by the board of health. Pleading for government intervention, Goldwater
anticipated that the shortage of doctors, nurses, and hospital beds would be
detrimental to the city of New York. Despite this, Copeland again denied the
existence of a problem, refusing to admit the need for outside help. However,
with the incidence of cases of influenza reaching beyond two thousand people
within the five Burroughs, it was becoming more and more difficult for Copeland
to continue to hide the influenza problem.87 On October 7, another article
published in the New York Times summed up the fears among New Yorkers
affected by the epidemic. The author expressed concerns about keeping the
schools open. He also feared the effects of the nursing shortage, as he wrote,
“The closing of schools is a debatable question. Dr. Copeland’s reasons for
keeping them open are not altogether convincing. There is one thing health
officials everywhere should do. As doctors are few and nurses are scarce,
families should be educated by clear and simple bulletins to look after their
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sick.”88 However, Copeland neglected the warnings of the Public Health Board
and the general public until the epidemic reached a point where even the strictest
quarantines would prove ineffective.
As the panic increased, Copeland finally initiated quarantines, but the
damage had already been done. With death rates higher than anywhere else in the
country, statisticians were no longer able to keep track of people. With the failure
to gain government support from the city and Federal Boards, it was evident that
there was an increasing fear among patients that they would not receive the care
they would need. Panicking, these patients resorted to desperate measures, going
so far as to kidnap nurses to ensure treatment and care.89 I argue that a rapid nonpharmaceutical response would have been more effective because the occurrence
of influenza deaths within New York City showed that the size of the city, and to
some extent the officials running the Board of Public Health, were ill prepared to
face a pandemic of this proportion. Laboratories in New York claimed to have
isolated Bacillus influenzae and were in the midst of producing liters and liters of
the bacteria in hopes of creating a vaccine.90 However, for the people in the city
of New York, their discoveries would be irrelevant, as a proper vaccine would do
nothing to save the 33,000 victims already.
Unlike Princeton, NJ, New York City did not have the luxury of a small
town with minimal contact from larger surrounding areas. While Princeton was
able to successfully combat the influenza epidemic, its size and isolated location
had a lot to do with its success. Therefore, maintaining similarly strict
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quarantines in a city with the population size of New York would have been
extremely hard to maintain, if not impossible. However, although Howard
Markel argues that New York City did implement quarantine measures eleven
days prior to the arrival of the first influenza cases, the evidence shows that they
did not maintain these measures in practice.91 The schools were never closed, and
although Dr. Copeland tried to initiate a quarantine regulation, he was not able to
maintain these regulations throughout the course of the epidemic. Whereas we
saw with Princeton, NJ, the quarantine was not lifted until the Board of Health
was sure the epidemic within Princeton and the surrounding cities was under
control. Therefore, size, location, and response played a combining part in the
toll influenza had on both Princeton and New York City.
Local Response: Syracuse, NY
With a population in between that of New York City and Princeton,
Syracuse, NY did not have the advantages of cutting itself off from the rest of the
nation like Princeton but also did not have to deal with the arrival of hundreds of
sick soldiers from overseas like New York. Located in Central New York, like
many other areas in the country, Syracuse served as a training base for soldiers
during the war and therefore placed itself at risk for communicable diseases from
mobilizing troops. With its own Student Army Training Corps, similar to
Princeton, Syracuse University also had to find a middle ground for protecting its
soldiers while also working closely with the community to ensure the safety of the
public through the use of non-pharmaceutical interventions.
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By the end of September, the city of Syracuse was already facing a serious
problem due to the influenza epidemic. The resources in the city were stretched
thin and many of the hospitals were filled to their maximum occupancy. As one
doctor noted, “The public does not realize its danger. But the physicians of the
city are giving serious thought to the situation.”92 Among the local hospitals there
were 600 soldiers from the military camp crowding the hallways, with 150 taking
place in the Hospital of the Good Shepherd and 200 in Crouse-Irving Hospital.
With only 175 beds available for soldiers in the Hospital of the Good Shepherd to
begin with, the doctors not only had to worry about where they were going to
place the additional sick, but also how to protect the civilian patients in the
hospital with other ailments.93
To make more room for the influenza patients, physicians had to
improvise by finding other locations and methods of taking care of the
overwhelming number of sick. Giving up their own private offices, doctors and
surgeons brought in soldiers and made room for them by placing cots in the
reception rooms. The surrounding hospitals did the same aligning the corridors
with cots, spreading them throughout the entire hospital including wards
designated for women and children. In addition, Syracuse University provided
room for soldiers in the students’ infirmary at the hospital, at their chapel, and in
the nursing classrooms.94 As the epidemic worsened, Syracuse University as well
as numerous fraternities located on College Place and Walnut Avenue continued
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to open their doors to the soldiers in need. Houses such as Alpha Chi Rho, Phi
Kappa, Psi Upsilon, Delta Kappa Epsilon, Phi Kappa Alpha, and Phi Delta Theta
welcomed these soldiers by turning their houses into barracks, as well as other
dormitories owned by the university such as Winchell Hall, Wilbor, Annable, and
Babcock and Clark Cottages. However, not all of the Greek organizations on
campus were as welcoming. The Alpha Phi, Kappa Kappa Gamma, and Chi
Omega sorority houses defined themselves as “off-campus,” and therefore under
the regulation of the quarantine authorities, could not be visited by the soldiers.
For some of the lonely soldiers, however, the Gamma Phi Beta and Alpha Chi
Omega sororities were still considered to be on campus and accessible for visits.95
While Syracuse University and the community of Syracuse can take pride
in their patriotism for caring for the soldiers in need, by doing so they also put
themselves at a greater risk of becoming victims of the epidemic. As the hospitals
crowded the hallways with soldiers infected with influenza, they were exposing
other patients in the hospital to the disease as well. Similarly on campus, both the
fraternities and the dormitories were now in complete contact with these soldiers
who could be potentially infected. Unlike Princeton University, where 92 percent
of the students were enrolled in some military organization (and predominantly
male), Syracuse University was more diverse and therefore unable to adopt the
strict military quarantine. In addition, while Princeton University was able to
keep the college and the community separate, Syracuse University and the
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Student Army Training Corps looked to the local hospitals for help and therefore
came into closer contact with the local citizens.96
Unlike New York City, however, Syracuse did take more active measures
in preventing further spread of the epidemic in the community. In an article
published in The Syracuse Herald, State Health Commissioner Herman Briggs
announced that he saw little use for a strict quarantine, but he did advise the
public to avoid crowded places whenever possible. Unfortunately for the
commissioner, his reasoning for not implementing a quarantine was flawed as he
explained, “strict quarantine measures such as one would take against other
infectious diseases while theoretically desirable, are not practical in view of the
highly contagious character and the widespread extent of the disease and the
general susceptibility to it.”97
Fortunately for the Syracuse community, the mayor of Syracuse had his
own agenda placing a strict ban on all public gatherings ten days after the
publication of the state commissioner’s advice on influenza. Some of the places
the mayor banned from public gatherings included schools, churches, movie
theaters, dance halls, and roller skating rinks, as well as lodge meetings, Liberty
Loan meetings, public funerals, and unorganized gatherings on playgrounds.98 In
the same article published that day, Syracuse University also made the decision to
finally strictly isolate itself from the rest of the community. In a conference call
between Mayor Stone, Dr. Totman, and Chancellor James R. Roy, they made the
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decision together that isolating the University would be in the best interest of the
safety of the local citizens and the students. In addition the quarantine, they made
it clear that “students who live in Syracuse homes will not be permitted to attend
classes on the hill and students from out of town will not be permitted to come to
the city for any purpose.”99 In addition the university military camps were also
isolated from the rest of the university.
By the end of the pandemic, Syracuse did not escape the effects as
skillfully as Princeton, but did not suffer to the extent of New York City. Peaking
in the middle of October, before the influenza epidemic would leave Syracuse that
month, it would contribute to 678 deaths and over 20,000 cases.100,101 While
Syracuse recognized the threat of the pandemic and initiated quarantine measures
to reduce the spread, by the time the quarantines were in place the hospitals were
already filled with influenza victims. The Syracuse community, therefore,
represents a prime example of how important it was to initiate quarantine
measures quickly and efficiently in order to reduce the occurrence of influenza.
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Chapter 4
America’s forgotten pandemic? A glance back at 1918 from a present day
perspective.
Perhaps the most daunting fact about the 1918 pandemic is that it killed
millions of people in less than one year. An estimated one third of the world’s
population was infected with an exceptional severity of disease with case fatality
rates greater than 2.5%, as compared to less than 0.1% in other influenza
pandemics.102 An estimated 50 million people worldwide and 675,000 in the
United States died as a result of the pandemic, and in some communities in the
U.S., 10% of the population died within a two-week period.103 John M. Barry has
labeled the 1918 influenza pandemic as “the deadliest plague in history,” killing
more people than any other outbreak the world has known.104 No infection, war,
or famine has ever killed more people in as short a period. Even more shocking
than these numbers, however, is that it has never inspired awe among citizens of
any particular country including citizens of the United States.105 Beyond the
mysteries of the virus itself, therefore, one of the greatest questions surrounding
the 1918 pandemic is, “why has America tended to forget the flu’s existence?”
Alfred Crosby’s book, America’s Forgotten Pandemic, published in 1976, was
one of the first historical books written on the 1918 influenza pandemic and
continues to be one of the best references on the event. However, since 1999, a
search of www.amazon.com has listed over ten books recently published on the
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Spanish influenza pandemic. So why is it that the world forgot this pandemic in
the first place, and why in recent years has there suddenly been a greater interest
in reexamining the 1918 virus both historically and scientifically?
In the years directly following the 1918 pandemic there was no indication
that the government or the people were enthusiastic to relive the memory of the
pandemic. In the 1920s public and private expenditures on medical research were
barely one fiftieth what they would become after WWII. Of that funding,
Congress made no special appropriation for influenza research and more had been
done since 1918 for threats of polio, heart disease, and cancer.106 Among United
States citizens Crosby noted, “The average college graduate born since 1918
literally knows more about the Black Death of the fourteenth century than the
World War I pandemic, although it is undoubtedly true that several of his or her
older friends or relatives lived through it and, if asked, could describe the
experiences in some detail.”107 Although the 1918 pandemic is further removed
from our memories since the 1970s, the fear and knowledge of the pandemic still
seems to be lacking.
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One reason Crosby gives for the memory loss directly following the
pandemic in 1919 is that it was masked over with all the other horrors of the war.
Unique to the pandemic of 1918, there was a large amount of deaths in the age
group of 15-35 years, something that has not been witnessed with influenza
pandemics prior to and following the one in 1918 (figure 6). While there have
been many debates, with no definitive answer as to why this occurred, the fact
remains that this age group of young adults was the same age as those who were
lost in combat.108 The names of young men listed in the obituaries, therefore,
were blended between those who died in the war and those who died from disease
at home. Of the soldiers that died during the war, there was also an overlap
between those who died of diseases and those who died of battle wounds. The
obituaries never specified the actual cause of death for these soldiers. The
pandemic became concealed within the war. In addition, the influenza pandemic
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was not as impressive for the time period as it would be seen today. Epidemics of
cholera, yellow fever, and typhoid were common place for most of those affected
by the 1918 influenza pandemic. The Spanish flu, therefore, was different in its
degree of size and transmissibility, but the world was used to epidemics of some
scale.109
Beyond the horrors of the war, the physiology of victims that succumbed
to the influenza virus infection allowed the disease to escape collective memory.
Unlike smallpox or polio (other diseases of the early twentieth century), influenza
is normally not physically disfiguring. The very nature of the virus is forgettable
as it infects its victims and then disappears without a trace. The flu does not
normally linger and cause chronic infections and it does not leave behind a whole
population of crippled citizens to remind those decades after the disease has
already passed of the severe pandemic. Also unlike polio victims, such as
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, there was no spokesperson for influenza. The
pandemic did not kill a world leader or leave anyone behind to fight for greater
awareness of the disease, as most made a fully recovery and were just as quick to
forget about it.110
In addition, despite the number of people estimated to have died from the
flu, the epidemiological characteristics of the virus prevented it from becoming
feared among most Americans. Even in 1918, the highest case fatality rate
estimates were around two percent. Unfortunately, since influenza is highly
transmissible, approximately one third of the world’s population was infected,
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resulting in a large number of fatalities.111 Nevertheless, even with a strain of
highly pathogenic influenza like that of 1918, the majority of the people infected
still survived. Therefore, although there has never been another disease that has
killed more people in as short a time as the 1918 influenza pandemic, most have
not come to fear it. Other diseases such as AIDS, rabies, and ebola are much
more feared than influenza and although they do have a higher case fatality rate,
they have not claimed as many victims.112
Coming on the heels of the nineteenth-century Bacteriological Revolution,
the 1918 influenza pandemic made a mockery of the United States’ new found
optimism of disease prevention. It would take twelve more years until the
causative agent was identified, and although the germ theory disease had been
developed, it offered no protection against influenza. Prior to 1918, Americans
felt relieved that infectious diseases were not as life-threatening anymore and
each discovery of a new pathogen drove home the message that science was
winning the war on germs. Then came the flu epidemic, and it was more
comforting to push it out of America’s memory than to face the realization that
there were still some diseases that science could not understand. It was much
easier to “see no evil, hear no evil.”113 As years passed, the horrors of the
pandemic quickly faded from America’s memory. However, about twenty years
ago a new interest in the 1918 influenza pandemic emerged and slowly it is
regaining consciousness within America’s memory.
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Nearly a century later, science and history scholars have regained an
interest in the pandemic of 1918. One possible explanation for this occurrence is
that science had finally caught up to historical analyses. Following seventy-five
years of research after the pandemic, researchers still could not answer the most
basic question, which was, “what caused this particular virus to become so fatal?”
Although techniques for isolating influenza viruses had become much more
advanced, there had been no success at obtaining viral RNA fragments from lung
samples of victims in 1918 and isolating the particular strain that caused the
pandemic. The first human influenza viruses were isolated in the early 1930s and,
therefore, characterization of the 1918 strain had to rely on indirect evidence.114
In 1995, a team of scientists identified archival influenza autopsy
materials collected in the autumn of 1918 and began the process of sequencing
small viral RNA fragments to determine the genomic structure of the causative
influenza virus. An extremely difficult task, Jeffrey Taubenberger and Ann Reid
worked tediously using new the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) technique to
make multiple copies of RNA from paraffin-embedded tissue. Essentially, not
knowing if they would even find it, they were looking for possibly a single
molecule of flu virus hiding within the tissues.115 Working with extremely small
pieces of RNA, Taubenberger and Reid would have to design nine degenerate
consensus RT-PCR primers to amplify the small influenza protein fragments
under 200 nucleotides (RNA templates lager than 200 nucleotides were not
amplifiable). Using this technique they were able to successfully amplify and
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sequence all nine fragments of RNA.116 The only drawback to Taubenberger’s
samples was that they were encased in chucks of paraffin and extremely small.
As a result there was doubt that he would be able to find the complete genetic
sequence as his 1997 paper only characterized five fragmented genes of the eight
total of the influenza virus.
However, following the fame of Taubenberger’s paper, he would receive
the solution to this problem from a seventy-two year old retired pathologist. In
1951 John Hultin had made a trip to Alaska to uncover tissue samples from still
frozen bodies of flu victims that had been buried in a mass grave. Although
Hultin failed in 1951 to isolate viral RNA from tissue samples of these victims, he
believed that Taubenberger’s new methods provided the difference between
failure and success. Not wanting to face government restrictions and potential
liability if he found live virus among the tissue samples, Hultin planned his
second trip back to Alaska on his own, funding the entire trip privately. With
unbelievable luck, Hultin came across one victim that had not decayed as much as
the others in the grave because she was obese and with the permafrost her lungs
had remained intact. Naming her “Lucy,” Hultin carefully took the lungs out of
the victim, and mailed them to Taubenberger in four separate packages. With
these new preserved samples, Taubenberger and Reid’s work went along with
tremendous success as they found viral RNA fragments in the lungs of Lucy as
Hultin had predicted. From these tissues, Taubenberger was able to characterize
the entire hemagglutinin gene and seven years later would publish the final paper
in which he was able to complete the coding sequence of all eight RNA
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fragments.117 With ethical criticisms aside, from these published eight coding
sequences it was now possible to synthesize a live virus from the fall wave of the
1918 influenza pandemic. This research was done by Terry Tumpey at the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, who confirmed the uniquely highvirulence phenotype observed with the pandemic virus (figure 7).118

Finally, science had begun to catch up to historical analyses. By 2005, the
entire sequence of the 1918 virus was known, and confirmed to be more virulent
than normal endemic cases of influenza. One question that historians were unable
to answer, therefore, scientists could now convey. The large numbers of fatalities
in 1918 were not just an inefficient response by the United States Public Health
Service nor were they only a factor of troops being mobilized for the war. The
viral mechanism of the 1918 virus strain was unusually virulent. In contrast to
other human H1N1 influenza viruses, the 1918 virus was able to replicate in the
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absence of trypsin, a protease that aids in the cleavage of hemagglutinin
molecules, and thought to be a prerequisite for multicycle replication. It is
believed that the ability of an influenza virus to replicate in the absence of trypsin
is an important determinant of its pathogenicity.119 In addition, to evaluate the
pathogenicity of the 1918 strain in mammalian species, BALB/c mice were
inoculated with 106 PFU (plaque-forming units) and succumbed to infection as
early as three days post-infection, which was in contrast to a low pathogenic
(Tx/91) strain in which the virus did not kill the mice. Not surprisingly, the lung
pathology of the mice infected with the 1918 strain was more pronounced and
showed acute pulmonary adema and/or hemorrhage with acute bronchiolitis,
alveolitis, and bronchopneumonia.120
With the characterization of the final polymerase genes of the 1918
influenza virus in 2005, it became possible to deduce the origins of the pandemic
strain. Of the three polymerase genes that form the polymerase complex (PA,
PB1, PB2), it was shown that each gene differed from the avian consensus
sequence by less than ten genes. This is consistent with the hypothesis that this
particular strain derived from an avian source shortly before the pandemic.121
Ironically, only months after Taubenberger’s first characterization of the
pandemic strain in 1997, Nancy Cox of the CDC received word of a case of an
avian influenza virus of type H5N1 in Hong Kong. Not only was this a strain of
virus that should never have infected a human being, but the person it infected
was a three-year-old boy and he had died. At the time, fear spread amongst
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influenza virologists that this could be the potential start of another fatal pandemic
like that of 1918. Unfortunately the viral mechanisms of the 1918 virus had yet to
be uncovered and therefore there was no template for understanding highly
pathogenic influenza. A few months following the first case in Hong Kong things
began to snowball as more cases of avian influenza were reported with eighteen
people hospitalized from November to December, with eight placed on respirators
and six died. Although it was found that these cases of avian influenza were not
yet transmissible from human to human, it became a wake up call for those who
had forgotten how devastating a case of influenza can be.
Currently without the ability to produce effective egg based avian
influenza vaccines, the realization that pandemic planning efforts for influenza
would have to be reorganized hit home to many academics and policy makers.
With over 200 hundred deaths due to avian influenza since 2003 and an overall
case fatality rate of 61 percent, scientist and historians agree that it is only a
matter of time before we are faced with another influenza pandemic.122 To date,
the best template we have for understanding the effects that this pandemic may
have on modern day populations is the 1918 influenza pandemic. As a result, it is
no longer possible to wipe away the memories of 1918. In the last twenty years,
scientific research has reached a level in which it has been possible to understand
the viral mechanisms that has lead to an unusually high pathogenicity of the virus.
However, there is still a lot unknown about the 1918 influenza virus that science
has yet to discover. Specifically, how is it that the influenza virus communicates
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with the host cell, and what possible advantages does the 1918 virus have over
other low pathogenic viruses? This particular question would become the focus
of my research in the Katze Lab at the University of Washington, through the
studies of both viral and mammalian proteins that aided in the replication of
influenza viruses.
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Chapter 5
Translational Control and the Host-Immune Response: Determining the
Virulence of Influenza
Introduction
Influenza viruses are among the most common causes of human
respiratory infections and among the most significant because they cause high
morbidity and mortality. With the potential to cause major outbreaks, to
immunologically naïve human populations, influenza viruses are also a major
threat to public health.123 One of the best known characteristics of influenza virus
is its ability to generate particularly virulent strains that can cause global
pandemics. Three of these pandemics have occurred over the last century, the
worst, in 1918, resulted in over 500,000 deaths in the United States and an
estimated 40 million worldwide. Since then, all influenza A pandemics and
almost all cases of influenza A worldwide have been caused by a descendant of
the 1918 virus, which is composed of “drifted” H1N1 viruses and reasserted
H2N2 and H3N2 viruses.124 Current concerns of an avian influenza pandemic
similar to the “Spanish Flu” of 1918 have increased the importance of
understanding the virulence of the virus and the viral mechanisms of translational
control.
The influenza virus belongs to the family Orthomyxoviridae, which is
defined by viruses that have a negative-sense, single-stranded, and segmented
RNA genome. Five different genera belong to the family including influenza
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viruses A, B, and C, Thogtovirus, and Isavirus. All A- and B-type influenza
viruses possess eight RNA segments, while influenza C viruses only have seven.
Influenza viruses contain and envelope harboring the hemagglutinin (HA),
neuraminidase (NA), and the M2 proteins that protrude from the surface of the
protein (figure 8).

Different influenza virus strains are named according to their genus, the
species from which the virus was isolated, the location of the isolate, the number f
the isolate, the year of isolation, and in the case of influenza A, the HA and NA
subtypes.125 Therefore, influenza viruses are classified by the differences in their
nucleocapsid and matrix proteins, which are structures that mutate rapidly and
facilitate attachment to the host cells. The reservoir for influenza A viruses
subtypes are wild aquatic birds, with only the H1-3 and N1-2 subtypes commonly
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known to infect humans.126 All three pandemics occurring in the twentieth
century (1918, 1957, and 1968) occurred from three different antigenic subtypes
of influenza A virus: H1N1, H2N2, and H3N2, respectively. Therefore evidence
has suggested that true pandemics with changes in hemagglutinin subtypes arise
from genetic reassortment with animal influenza A viruses.127
Influenza viral replication begins through the binding of neuraminic acids
(sialic acids) on the surface of cells to initiate infection. This interaction is
constrained to the hemagglutinin protein, which binds to specific sialic acid
receptors based on different species and their specificity toward sialic acids with
different linkages. Human viruses preferentially bind to N-acetylneuraminic acid
attached to the penultimate galactose sugar by an α2,6 linkage whereas avian
viruses bind to sialic acid with an α2,3 linkage most of the time.128 One of the
greater protections, therefore, against an avian strain mutating into transmissible
human to human influenza is the inability of certain HA proteins to bind to some
species of sialic acid receptors and not others. Although it is possible for
influenza viruses to cross species, this variation makes the jump more difficult.
Unfortunately, swine influenza shares the same sialic acid receptors of both
human and avian influenza viruses. This makes it possible for swine to become
co-infected with human and avian influenza viruses causing a possible
reassortment that may lead to the emergence of new pandemic strains of
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influenza.129 It is hypothesized that the 1918 influenza virus has its origin in
avian species and that a single amino acid change allowed the HA to recognized
the α2,6-sialic acid linkage.130 The degree at which the HA protein attaches to the
cell to initiate replication is, therefore, one of the determinants of pathogenicity.
Following binding to the cell, the virus is internalized through
endocytosis. The low pH of the endosome activates fusion of the viral and
endosomal membranes, releasing the viral nucleic proteins (vRNPs) into the
cytoplasm where they are then imported to the nucleus. Inside the nucleus they
serve as the template for transcription and new proteins are synthesized from viral
mRNA. Newly synthesized viral RNPs are exported from the nucleus to the
assembly site at the plasma membrane where new particles bud and are
released.131 After the viral envelope has separated from the cell membrane, the
influenza particles need to be actively released from the cell. Since the HA
anchors the virus by binding to sialic acid-containing receptors, the surface
glycoprotein, NA must remove the sialic acid allowing the virus to release from
its host cell.132 Inhibition of the NA enzymatic activity causes viral particles to
clump together at the cell surface, which results in infectivity and will severely
inhibit viral replication. As a result, NA protein inhibitors are currently one of the
most common approaches to the development of antiviral influenza drugs.
Relenza® and Tamiflu® are two NA inhibitors that are currently on the market.133
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Since both HA and NA recognize the same molecule, but with opposing effects, a
delicate balance exists between these two proteins and greatly contributes to the
pathogenicity of individual influenza viruses. As major surface proteins that play
an important role in viral entry and release, these proteins are often the targets for
vaccines and antiviral medications. However, as they are on the surface of the
viral envelope they are also rapidly mutating and vaccines must be continually
altered to compensate for these changes.
One other ambiguous protein not as well studied in its contribution to
virulence is the non-structural-1 (NS1) protein. Unlike the HA and NA genes, the
NS1 protein is found within the viral envelope and highly conserved across
various viral strains. The NS1 functions as an interferon (IFN) antagonist that
allows efficient viral replication in IFN competent hosts. It is known to target
both INF-β production and the activation of IFN-induced antiviral genes.134 In
virus infected cells, the NS1 protein binds to double-stranded RNA and triggers
the activation of transcription factors such as AFT-2/cJun, NFκB, and IFN
regulatory factors (IRFs) that stimulate IFN-β production (figure 9). Once IFN-β
is activated it is secreted out of the cell where it can be taken up by the same or
different cells through type I IFN receptors. Signaling through the JAK (Janus
Kinases) –STAT (Signal Transducers and Activators of Transcription) pathway
activates key transcription factors that bind to the IFN-stimulated response
elements (ISRE) in promoters to activate transcription. Among the activated
genes are those encoding antiviral proteins. This induces an “antiviral state,”
providing a first line of defense against viral infection. Therefore, it is believed
134
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that the main role of the NS1 protein is to inhibit IFN-β to prevent this from
happening and allowing virally infected cells to “warn” neighboring cells they
may develop an antiviral defense.135 It is believed that the NS1 proteins may
differ among viruses in their abilities to counteract the cellular IFN system.

PKR, a double stranded RNA-activated cellular protein kinase, has been
extensively studied in its role of antiviral activity. The principle substrate through
which PKR mediates its antiviral effect is the translation initiation factor eIF-2α.
When activated PKR phosphorylates the alpha subunit of eIF2, causing a
generalized shut-off of translation initiation. Thus, activation of PKR during viral
infection can lead to a block in protein synthesis. Since high levels of protein
synthesis are a requirement for viral replication, viruses have evolved numerous
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mechanisms to prevent activation of PKR.136 One way in which the influenza
virus suppresses the PKR response is through the amino (N)-terminal dsRNA
binding domain of the NS1 portion of the NS gene segment. This works in
conjunction with its capabilities as a potent alpha/beta-IFN antagonist.
Interestingly, also involved with translational control and inhibition of
PKR in influenza virus infected cells is the cellular protein P58IPK. This protein
was discovered over twenty years ago by Michael Katze, during influenza super
infection in cells previously infected with an adenovirus mutant.137 Current
research has found that P58 not only regulates influenza virus mRNA translation
through inhibition of PKR, but that it may also play an important role in the
inhibition of PERK and eIF-2α kinase localized in the endoplasmic reticulum
(ER) and localized during ER stress. This ability of P58 to interact and inhibit
multiple eIF-2α kinases suggests that it is both a critical regulator of cellular and
viral mRNA translation.138 Currently the Katze Lab has developed in vitro and in
vivo experimentation to begin to further uncover the role of P58 during viral
infection.
The focus of my projects in the Katze Lab involved both the NS1 protein
of high and low pathogenic influenza virus strains including the 1918 influenza
virus and the cellular protein P58. The main purpose of these experiments was to
further uncover the translational control mechanisms and host-pathogen
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interactions of influenza virus infected cells. The next two sections of this chapter
will specifically focus on these two proteins and my research methods and results.
Part I: The Contribution of the NS1 Protein to the Virulence of Influenza
Viruses
The NS gene segment of Influenza A viruses encodes for both the NS1
and NEP proteins. The first 230 amino acids of the gene segment encode for the
NS1 protein and the last 121 encode for the NEP protein (figure 10). Current
literature suggests that the NS1 protein may contribute to the virulence of the
virus via three different mechanisms. The first hypothesis is that NS1 inhibits
RIG-I (retinoic-acid-inducible protein I), an RNA helicase that triggers a type I
IFN mediated response, and production of IFN-β mRNA through N-terminal
binding to dsRNA.139 The second hypothesis is that NS1 inhibits the 2’-5’oligo
(A) synthetase/RNase L pathway (interferon induced proteins with anti-viral
activity), through N-terminal binding to dsRNA. The third mechanism suggests
NS1 inhibits CPSF (cleavage and polyadenylation specific factor I) and PAB II
(poly(A) binding protein II) through C-terminal protein-protein interactions.140
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It is probable that NS1 proteins from different virus isolates or subtypes
function differently. In addition, the N-terminal and C-terminal contributions of
NS1 to virulence are still not completely known. Although three mechanisms
have been used to describe NS1, it is likely that the NS1 protein is doing more. In
addition, different NS1s may preferentially utilize one strategy over another or
combine the mechanisms that have been described. We have hypothesized that
through a possible combination of these mechanisms that the 1918 NS1 gene is
more efficient at expression of IFN-regulated genes than is the A/Texas/36/91
NS1 from a low pathogenic human influenza virus. This is on the basis of a
previous paper published by Gary Geiss, who suggested that the 1918 NS1is a
better suppressor of IFN than the A/WSN/33 NS1, a low pathogenic mouse
adapted virus.141
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A BLAST comparison of A/Brevig Mission 1/18 (1918, high pathogenic
virus) and A/Texas/36/91 (Texas, low pathogenic virus) indicates that the
differences in amino acid sequence between the two NS1 proteins are scattered
fairly evenly throughout the N- and C-termini. The N-terminal boxed sequence
that is known to be absolutely necessary for dsRNA binding is totally conserved
between the two proteins. In contrast, regions in the C-terminal end that are
known to bind to various cellular proteins (i.e. CPSF and PBAII) do contain
differences between the two virus types. Therefore, while it does not provide
proof of a mechanism it does suggest that differences in NS1 function for the
Texas and 1918 viruses may be due more to differences in their ability to bind
various cellular proteins than in their difference to bind dsRNA (figure 11).

Methods
The viral parent strain of influenza used for the microarray and taqman
experiments was the low pathogenic human influenza virus A/Texas/36/91
[H1N1]. Using reverse genetics, Terry Tumpy at the Center for Disease Control
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and Prevention created a mutant strain of the A/Texas/36/91 influenza virus with
seven genes from the original strain and the eighth NS gene segment from the
highly pathogenic A/Brevig Mission 1/18 [H1N1] strain of the 1918 influenza
pandemic. Since influenza is a negatively stranded RNA virus, introduction of its
genome RNA into cells does not result in the formation of an infectious virus.
Therefore, cDNA from each of the eight genome segments was cloned and then
transfected into mammalian cells along with four expression plasmids for
polymerase proteins and NP.
Using the immortal human A549 lung epithelial cell line, the wild type
and 1918 NS1 protein in the Texas backbone were infected in triplicate with an
MOI (multiplicity of infection) of two. RNA was harvested at two hours, six
hours, and twenty four hours post infection. A plague assay was taken at two
hours and twenty four hours post infection, which indicated that both viruses
replicate to similar titers in A549 cells (figure 12).
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For the microarray experiments the biological replicates were pooled so
that there is 510ng total RNA (170ng from each replicate) in 17 µL of water.
RNA spike-ins (A and B) used to calibrate measurements in the microarray
experiment by hybridizing with a specific control probe on the target array were
diluted serially as follows: 1:20, 1:800, and 1:3200. A total of 2µL of the 1:3200
mix was added to the probe labeling reagent. Depending on the spike-in, 3.2µL
of master mix A (Cy3) or B (Cy5) was added to each tube of pooled RNA at a
concentration of 30ng/µL. The mixture was denatured for 10 minutes at 65°C. A
total of 8.5 µL of cDNA master mix was added to each sample, which was then
incubated at 40°C for two hours. Transcription master mixes for Cy3 and Cy5
were prepared and a total of 60 µL of master mix was added to each appropriate
tube (Cy3 or Cy5). The probes were incubated at 40°C for two hours in the dark.
These pooled replicates were then compared to mock infected cells using Agilent
4x44K microarrays (figure 13).
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The cDNA for the taqman experiments were prepared using the same
RNA samples of the two viral strains that were provided by Dr. Tumpey. The
RNA samples were diluted in RNase free water to a concentration of 13.2 ng/µL .
These samples were treated with DNase using a concentration of 10x DNase 1
buffer and rDNase, followed by the addition of DNase inactivation reagent with
an addition of .1 volume to each sample. Using 250ng of RNA in a 50µL reaction
volume, the reverse transcription (RT) reaction was performed. The cDNA
product was then diluted to 500µL using water. For the Taqman experiments,
equal volumes of cDNA and 2x Master Mix are added. Each probe being tested
was added in quadruplicate to the cDNA and the Master Mix solution. Using the
96-well plate, 20 µL of quadruplicate is added to each well.
Results
Microarray Experiments
While many signature genes are present in the total gene map (figure 14),
the experiments clustered according to their time points and not on their viral
strain. These results indicate that total gene expression is quite similar for both
viruses. In addition, the total number of signature genes increases over time. The
heat map suggests that the changes between the two viruses are subtle, and
therefore changes in the expression between the two viruses will require a more in
depth analysis.
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The first direction we took was to look at the microarray data for the
interferon-beta pathway. Since IFN-β is such an important upstream player in the
antiviral pathway and because IFN-β transcription reflects RIG-I activation, we
wanted to look at this gene specifically. The pattern of gene expression is
interesting in that the differences between the two viruses are obvious at 2 and 24
hours post-infection. Fitting with our hypothesis, the 1918 NS1 seems to suppress
IFN-β at the earlier time points and the suppression is not seen at 24 hours. In
contrast, IFN-β
is strongly upregulated early
on for the Texas
NS1 protein
(figure 15). Unfortunately this leaves more questions than answers. For example,
does this mean that RIG-I is being suppressed by the 1918 NS1 gene? Also, how
will early suppression of IFN-β affect later patterns of gene expression? And will
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the overall patterns of type I IFN gene expression correlate with IFN-β
expression?
To answer these questions we selectively clustered the type I IFNs and the
immediate downstream targets of IFN-β (ISRE driven genes). In general, there
are not major differences in gene expression patterns between the two viruses,
despite the promising evidence we saw from the contrasting IFN-β activation.
This suggests the type I IFN response is not a simple as the current dogma would
imply (figure 9). Our data suggests that the expression patterns of many type I
IFN response genes are the same whether or not IFN-β is being expressed.
Therefore, IFN-β may not control IFN stimulated genes (ISGs) as tightly as first
believed. It is evident over time that slightly different gene patterns do arise. A
similar population of genes at the six hour time point is up-regulated in the Texas
wild type but not in the 1918 NS1 mutant (figure 16). However, it does not
appear that the 1918 NS1 is behaving any differently than Texas in terms of
overall type I IFN response, but it might be targeting cellular genes more
effectively.
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We looked selectively at these cellular genes more closely in relation to
inflammation, immune response, and stress. Unlike the previous two heat maps,
this time we did see significant differences in gene patterns for the two viral
types. These differences are most striking at six hours post-infection. From this
data it appears that the NS1 is better at suppressing a specific subset of genes
found more downstream of IFN-β. This suggests that the ability to specifically
target genes on this list contributed to the virulence of the 1918 influenza virus
(figure 17).
To validate the microarray experiments, and to specifically look at certain
interferon stimulated genes, we ran a series of Taqman experiments. We were
specifically interested in the Mx1 and PKR proteins, which are both key
components of the IFN pathway. The expression of the Mx proteins in cell lines
inhibits the growth of several RNA viruses including influenza, and it has been
shown that mice lacking a functional Mx gene are sensitive to influenza virus
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infection.142 PKR has been previously described as an important protein in the
regulation of protein synthesis. We did not observe similar patterns between
these two genes as Mx1, was significantly suppressed by the 1918 NS1 and PKR
was suppressed more by the Texas wild type (not shown). Similarly, other
selected genes also followed these patters, with some preferentially suppressed by
the 1918 NS1 and others by the Texas NS1. Therefore, it was not possible to
deduce a dominant pattern for either of the NS1 proteins. However, the most
differences between the two NS1 proteins occurred early on (at either 2 or 6 hours
post-infection).

Discussion
Although no dominant pattern emerged from the Taqman data, these
studies did match the microarray data for specific ISGs. In addition, most of the
differences between the NS1 proteins occurred early, suggesting the importance
of suppressing the IFN pathway at the beginning of viral infection. The
142
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microarray data showed that IFN-β transcription is turned on early in the presence
of the Texas NS1 but is delayed in the presence of the 1918 NS1. However,
overall patterns of type I IFN gene expression did not correlate with IFN-β
expression, and they are similar in both NS1 species as opposed to differences
seen with IFN-β. In addition genes related to inflammation, immune response,
and stress do show different patterns of expression for the two NS1 species,
especially at the six hour time point. These results suggest that the NS1 protein
may be specifically targeting antiviral pathways by its ability to delay IFN-β
transcription and preferentially interact with unknown cellular proteins at its Cterminus. The differences seen between the two viral species also suggest that
there may be an underlying factor that allows the NS1 to contribute to the
virulence of the virus.
Part II: Protein-Protein Interactions of P58IPK and Characterization of the
P58IPK Pathway
For 27 years, P58IPK has been extensively studied by Michael Katze and
currently the Katze Lab. Past studies on P58IPK have shown that it is a known
inhibitor of PKR and PERK, which results in decreased eIF2-α phophorylation.
In the absence of infection P58IPK is a critical regulator of ER stress homeostasis
through its interaction with PERK. Since ER dysregulation is a cause of diabetes,
it was not a surprise that recently generated transgenic mice lacking P58 possess a
diabetic phenotype by four months of age. Since P58IPK is anti-apoptotic is was
also not surprising that these mice displayed increased levels of β-cell apoptosis
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as shown by both immunohistochemistry and global gene expression.143 It was
hypothesized that during viral infection P58 will maintain host homeostasis of the
anti-viral and inflammatory response thorough its interaction with PKR.
Interestingly, through a set of experiments it was shown that there is an increased
mortality in P58 -/- mice across a wide range of infectious doses. Increased PKR
activation and induction of its downstream targets may have been the cause of
increased pathology in the P58-/- mice.144 Therefore, it is believed that P58 acts
as a virulence factor by prolonging host survival and aiding in viral replication.
Under normal physiological conditions P58 is present in an inactive
complex with one ore more regulatory proteins. In response to influenza virus
infection P58 dissociates from its regulatory factors and is free to interact with
and regulate the activity of eIF2-α phosphorylation through a PKR mediated
mechanism. ER stress results in the transcriptional activation of P58 and an
increase in protein level through a PERK mediated mechanism; however, it is not
known if ER stress similarly results in a dissociation of P58 from its regulators.
In addition, P58 may also interact with other unidentified proteins to regulate
additional cellular functions including apoptotic or other pathways (figure 18).145
Based on this assumption, the goal of my research was to use proteomic
approaches to examine the role of P58 in the presence and absence of virus
infection through the identification of P58 interactive partners. These
experiments will be done at the protein level through the use of transient
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transfection in mammalian cells, protein purification, and determination of P58
interactive partners through mass spectrometry.

Recently theorized works of P58 and ER stress have been particularly
useful for this experimental design. These theories have placed P58 at different
locations within the cell in relation to the ER lumen. The first paper to be
published by the David Ron lab suggested that P58 mediates co-translational ER
protein degradation on the cytosolic face of the ER lumen, suggesting P58 is
located within the cellular cytoplasm.146 However, shortly after this publication,
the Randal Kaufman lab proposed the theory that P58 is an endogenous ER
luminal protein serving as a BiP co-chaperone, which suggests that P58 exists as a
possible membrane bound protein.147 Last year, the Ron lab conceded to this idea
in another publication suggesting that P58 posses an N-terminal signal peptide
that mediates translocation into the ER lumen, agreeing with the theory that some
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parts of P58 may be bound to the ER lumen.148 The Katze lab has not been
predominantly concerned with the position of P58, but more so with the role of
P58 during viral infection. However, my experiments on the over expression of
P58 supports the theory that P58 is indeed bound to the ER lumen, and our data
were generated with this assumption.
Methods
Over expression of P58
Human P58 was first cloned into the pTriEx-3 Neo expression vector.
This vector was chosen because it included both mammalian and bacterial
promoters as well as a histidine-tag that can be used for purification experiments.
Transient transfection in mammalian 293T cells were then performed following
the invitrogen lipofectamineTM 2000 protocol. One day prior to transfection,
25x105 cells were plated per well in 500 µL of growth media without antibiotics
and added to 6 cm plates (conditions can be scaled up or down accordingly). For
each transfection sample, DNA was diluted in 50 µL of Opti-MEM® I Reduced
Serum Meduim. Lipofectamine was also diluted into 50 µL of Opti-MEM® and
incubated at room temperature for five minutes. Following incubation, the diluted
DNA was combined with the lipofectamine reagent and incubated for 20 minutes.
The mixed complex was then added to each well containing cells and medium.
Optimal conditions resulted from a concentration of 0.4 µg/µL of lipofectamine
reagent and 1.6 µg of DNA.

Cells were harvested at 24 and 48 hours post-

transfection and lysed with Triton X-100. Cells were instantly flash frozen and

148

Kseniya Petrova et al., “Regulated association of misfolded endoplasmic reticulum luminal
proteins with P58/DNAJc3,” The Embo Journal 27, no. 21 (2008): 2862-2872.

89

saved for anti-P58 western blotting. Negative controls of empty vector and mock
transfected samples were also prepared by the same procedure for comparison.
Western Blots
Optimal conditions for western blotting resulted when samples were first
spun down prior to quantification of protein through the BCA protein assay kit by
Thermo Scientific. The protein and pellet were separated and SDS loading buffer
was then added to the samples in equal proportion to the concentration of protein.
A 10% SDS-PAGE gel was used for the western blot experiments and the
samples were run at 110V. The gel was then transferred at 0.3 amps for 3 hours
to the membrane. The membrane was then blocked with 5% non-fat dry milk
(NFDM) in TBS with 0.05% tween for two hours. The membrane was then
incubated overnight with the primary mouse antibody diluted 1:1000 with 1%
NFDM at 4 degrees. This antibody was washed with 0.05% tween three times
for 5 minutes. The secondary P58 9F10 monoclonal antibody was then diluted
1:10000 in 1% NFDM and added to the membrane for one hour at room
temperature. The anti-body was washed off following the same procedure as the
primary antibody and chemiluminscent solution was added to the membrane for
one minute. The membrane was placed in a film cassette and then exposed to
developing film for a varied time of 30 seconds to five minutes.
Immuno Precipitation
Data from western blot experiments suggested that the P58 protein is
bound to the ER lumen. Therefore, we attempted to purify this protein through
immunoprecipitation. Using the pellet from the cell lysates we incubated the
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samples with four different antibodies that included two monoclonal: 9F10 and
2F8, and two polyclonal antibodies: 1029 and 1589. The samples were incubated
for two hours at 4 degrees. Protein A was then added to the samples and then
incubated overnight at 4 degrees. These samples were then spun down and the
supernatant “flo” was collected for analysis. The pellet was washed four times
with NETN and re-suspended in SDS loading buffer to form the
immunoprecipitate (IP) sample for analysis. The flo and IP samples were then
analyzed through a western blot following the same procedure as the P58 protein
samples.
Mass Spectrometry
Due to the possible weight of the P58 protein and its possible association
with the ER lumen, we were unable to isolate the protein through
immunoprecipitation. Therefore, we had to reformat our experimental design to
prepare our protein samples for mass spectrometry. Triton X-100 was the original
low-salt detergent used to lyse the 293T cells, and was chosen because P58 and
other luminal proteins can be extracted from microsomes by even low
concentrations of non-denaturing detergents. Unfortunately the negative charge
on the triton X-100 obscures the mass spectrometry results, and by using higher
salt treatments we would run the risk of stripping the microsomal membranes.
Therefore, we followed the instructions of the mass spectrometry experts at the
Fred Hutch Cancer Research Center and purified our samples through SDSPAGE. We then extracted our purified protein from the gel and sent our samples
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to Fred Hutch for analysis with the LQ-Orbitrap mass spectrometer and the
human CPAS and X tandem libraries.
Results
Original experiments of isolated supernatant of the human and mouse P58
proteins did not show over expression of P58. The P58 is 58 kda in size and no
band was observed at this location for either mammalian protein across two time
points and three different concentrations of DNA. However, initial experiments
in which the pellet was isolated and prepared did show significant over expression
of P58 (figure 19). In these experiments we did not begin to spin down the pellet
until directly
before adding
the samples to
the SDS-PAGE.
Therefore, when
preparing the
mass
spectrometry samples we altered our experimental design slightly and began
isolating the pellet and supernatant immediately following the harvesting of the
cells. Surprisingly these experiments showed over expression of P58 in both the
pellet and supernatant of the hP58 protein. This indicated that not only was it
likely that the P58 protein is bound to the ER lumen, but that the addition of SDS
to the samples may aid in the lysing of the cell membrane in addition to the Triton
X-100, resulting in the observation of P58 within the supernatant. The empty
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pTriEx vector and mock transfected cells did not show an overexpression of P58.
However, a slight band in these samples suggests that P58 was being expressed
under normal conditions in these cells (figure 20).

Furthermore, immunoprecipitation of the P58 protein was unsuccessful at
isolating P58 protein in the IP samples. However, with the 9F10 monoclonal
antibody it appears that there may be some P58 present in the flo. This would
suggest that P58 may be bound to the ER lumen and therefore was too heavy to be
pulled down by the protein A, and therefore was not found in the pellet portion of
the precipitate (not shown).
The mass spectrometry samples were sent to Fred Hutch and analyzed in
the IPI human database. Using results with over 95% confidence rate, we
uploaded the identifications in the Ingenuity database. Mock-transfected and
empty vector-transfected samples show enrichment of non-specific protein
functions, as they are the same in both sample sets (not shown). However, the top
two categories from the human P58IPK-transfected sample set are “protein
synthesis” and “RNA post-transcriptional modifications” (figure 21). The “non-
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specific” functions follow these. Network analysis of the “protein synthesis” and
“RNA post-transcriptional modifications” categories are shown in figure 22 and
23. Translation factors and ribosomal proteins are shown to be enriched when
P58IPK is over expressed.
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Discussion
The original supernatant from the 293T cell lysates did not show over
expression of P58, which has led us to hypothesize that P58 is an ER luminal
protein. In addition our mass spectrometry data shows that the P58IPK-transfected
samples have increase interactions with protein synthesis and RNA-post
transcriptional modifications. Under normal conditions, it is believed that P58IPK
is involved protein synthesis and therefore the data is consistent with our
predications.
Future directions will involve confirming that the enriched proteins do
bind and interact with P58IPK by a series of western blot experiments. In addition,
we have recently begun collaboration with experts on the yeast-two hybrid system
as a way of testing for further interactions that will ideally overlap with data from
the mass spectrometry. We would also like to repeat these experiments under
different cell conditions and selectively identify interaction partners involved in
P58IPK activation during influenza virus infection, ER dress, and during both ER
stress and influenza virus infection.
The first challenge of these experiments was to ensure the specificity of
the protein interactions for these experiments. There are many difficulties
involved with transient transfection-based assays given the structural diversity
among proteins. However, through my experiments I was able to find a stable
cell line that expressed HIS-tagged P58IPK , which will be useful for further mass
spectrometry experiments. Although in our initial experiments we did not attempt
to purify the P58IPK protein by binding the his tag to a column, it is a possibility.
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This would allow for further protein interaction experiments using the “pulldown” method by binding P58IPK to a column and introduce a cellular protein
mixture of potential binding partners endogenous to the P58IPK environment.
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Epilogue
Modern Day Pandemic Preparedness Plans: What Can We Learn From
the 1918 Pandemic?

Most scientists and historians agree that it is only a matter of time until the
next influenza pandemic occurs. While its projected severity remains a mystery,
it is likely that if it would be avian in nature, it would have the potential to
drastically impact global health. However, the tools needed to combat this
disease both scientifically and socially continue to be debated. With the
experiences of dealing with a highly pathogenic strain of influenza existing in the
distant past, both historians and researchers are racing against the clock in hopes
of being prepared for when the next pandemic strikes.
While scientists have been warning about the threat of an avian influenza
pandemic for years, the reality of this possibility hit close to home for one small
village in Indonesia in April of 2006. While other areas of the world have
suffered from recent effects of avian influenza, the greatest cause for alarm in
Indonesia was that its outbreak offered some of the first evidence of an H5N1
avian influenza being transmittable from one human being to another.149 While
occurring in an isolated community, the threat of the spread of avian influenza
from human to human was clear.
Perhaps acting as a warm-up in 2003, the SARS epidemic showed the
twenty-first century how vulnerable we really are as a global community. People
stopped traveling to affected areas, airports, hotels, and the travel industry felt the
149
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effects. In some areas factories and offices shut down because employees were
reluctant to risk going to work. Although a relatively short epidemic, it was
enough to give the world a taste of what an infectious respiratory disease
epidemic caused by a new virus could be like. In many ways it became a dress
rehearsal for a potential influenza pandemic. However, the lessons from the 1918
H1N1 pandemic, which killed over 50 million people worldwide, remain the best
model for pandemic influenza preparing.
The continental United States in 1918 contained many features of the
modern world we currently live in, including rapid transportation, automobiles,
rapid means of communication, and large heterogeneous populations concentrated
in urban areas. Although some were still being developed, there were also public
health agencies at various levels of government. However, there were also very
important differences that contributed to a difference in the effectiveness of
thwarting an influenza pandemic, such as the understanding of private and civil
constitutional rights as related to public health and governmentally directed
measures. In addition, the general perceptions and trust of the medical field
especially in relation to vaccines and treatment have significantly changed.
Meanwhile, the magnitude of media exchange and travel has drastically increased
with the internet and air transportation. At the same time it has become much
easier to avoid human contact in the twenty-first century with the ability to
conduct most of daily living through the internet. However, although much has
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changed, the same idea that sparse populations and infrequent human contact are
among the best defenses against influenza still stands.150
Reexamining the ways in which the national government handled the
pandemic of 1918 could be valuable in formulating a modern day government
preparedness plan. It would be particularly useful to understand the impact of
newly emerging global diseases in the twenty-first century. Due to the rapid
mutation rate of the influenza virus, although presently vaccinations for influenza
are available, it takes months for scientists to develop annual vaccines to protect
against particular strains present within the world population from year to year.151
Therefore, a critical responsibility of influenza planning is to develop nonpharmaceutical interventions that may play a role in delaying the effects of a
pandemic and reducing the number of cumulative deaths.

Influenza is still

incurable, and the antigenic shift of the virus means that each year the potential
threat of a pandemic strain of influenza increases as the virus continues to mutate.
Therefore, understanding the limitations of vaccine development and the
effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical interventions is indispensable.
In January of 2009, the Committee on Homeland Security published an
updated influenza pandemic preparedness plan for the United States. This report
outlined many weaknesses in the current approach to getting ready for pandemic
influenza. The most immediate of these problems included the lack of a uniform
system of early warning and detection, a limited authority of federal priority on
150
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pandemic preparedness, poor examples set by Executive Branch Departments and
agencies working together, limited use of pharmaceutical interventions, and the
lack of recommendations for non-pharmaceutical interventions.152 Interestingly,
these were the same issues that were problematic in 1918 as well. Key
recommendations, however, have been made to circumvent these problems. This
has included a restoration in White House leadership of national efforts to get
ready for pandemic influenza, reports on a consistent basis, a reorientation to
health care delivery of very limited resources, and to fill in the gaps of federal
planning.
With current technology, the likelihood that an individual would be able
to survive an infection of a highly virulent influenza virus has dramatically
increased since 1918. However, it is important to recognize that the level of care
and resources it takes to treat a particular individual would not be available during
a true pandemic. While it is extremely important for scientists to understand the
mechanisms of highly pathogenic influenza strains in order to develop effective
pharmaceutical treatments, it must be accepted that their availability in mass
quantity will not be ready immediately. For example, even if cell-based vaccine
production technology were available now, it would still take at least three
months for experts to isolate the virus and produce an effective vaccine. Using
current egg-based technology the window of time is six months. However, many

152

U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security, “Getting Beyond Ready for Pandemic
Influenza,” Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman, (January 2009).

100

non-pharmaceutical interventions that could prevent the spread of disease can be
implemented at any time.153
Many lives and dollars could be saved by a public that is prepared and
informed about the dangers of pandemic influenza. Unfortunately, the only
recommendations the Committee on Homeland Security gave were to practice
proper hygiene and limit unnecessary individual contact.154 The World Health
Organization (WHO) has provided a more detailed plan for the use of nonpharmaceutical interventions within their pandemic influenza guidelines. Last
updated in 2005, they recommended improvements on communication and
distribution of public health information tailored and targeted to the general
population, which can be distributed at any time. In the case of infection, the
WHO suggests confinement appropriate to the local population, face masks for
infected persons and those seeking care, voluntary home quarantine of infected
individuals, and consideration of school closures and public places when it is
believed that these places are contributing to disease transmission.155
Beyond recommendations of increased surveillance and improvements
between local and government communication, these were also suggestions that
were given and to some degree implemented in various cities across the United
States in 1918. Therefore, it is extremely important for us to unmask the
mysteries of the 1918 pandemic to the best of our abilities. In order to understand
the effectiveness of these interventions in the past, it is necessary to not only
153
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evaluate the preventative measures taken across various locations but to also
understand the genetic makeup of the 1918 viral strain. Based upon my historical
research, some of the non-pharmaceutical interventions that were implemented
were successful in reducing fatalities. These included closing of pubic gatherings
and schools, as well as implementation of quarantine measures. When these
measures were not introduced in larger cities that had prior warning of the
pandemic, they were faced with disastrous effects similar to the outbreak in
Philadelphia. However, the increased fatalities in these cities cannot be blamed
only on the failure of public health authorities. In addition, even in the larger
cities that did institute non-pharmaceutical interventions, they did not completely
avoid fatalities from influenza. Optimally, however, appropriate nonpharmaceutical intervention implementation would decrease the burden on
healthcare services and critical infrastructure.
The genetic makeup of the 1918 influenza virus has allowed it to evade
the body’s immunological defense system better than subsequent viruses.
Although in recent years, scientists have been able to capture the 1918 virus and
isolate its genetic sequence, we have yet to indentify the protein or proteins that
acted as the murder weapon. However, modern day medicine has armed doctors
with antiviral medications and vaccines that were not available in 1918. In
addition, antibiotics will reduce the number of fatalities from pneumonia-causing
bacteria that often produced secondary infections in patients infected with
influenza.156
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The increased fatality of the 1918 pandemic was a combination of factors.
Improvements in communication and clear distribution of power among local,
national, civilian, and military authorities may have reduced the number of
fatalities in varying cities. In addition, those who implemented quarantine
measures and kept them throughout the duration of the second wave of the
pandemic also fared better than those cities that did not. Also, it was shown that
the fully reconstructed 1918 influenza virus is highly lethal, and it is believed that
small genetic changes can greatly affect pathogenesis.157 In addition social,
political, and economic factors interact with ecological factors to drive influenza
viruses to respond through biological and genetic factors, thus evading human
defense mechanisms. The challenge to the prevention and control of influenza as
a natural threat, therefore, elucidates the ultimate challenge of addressing the
convergence of factors that led to its emergence in the first place.158 In a modern
day global community, the need for an interdisciplinary approach cannot be
overstressed.
It is currently impossible to predict the emergence of a future pandemic
other than to strongly suspect that one will eventually occur. It is also impossible
to predict when and where this pandemic will occur, what subtype it will be, and
what degree of morbidity and mortality it will produce. Although there is a high
concern of an H5N1 pandemic due to its high case fatality rate, experts also
anticipate other possibilities for pandemic emergence. To improve the ability to
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predict influenza pandemics it is necessary to increase the knowledge of basic
biology and ecology underlying host-switching events. Also, it is necessary to
track current identifiable risks and enhance national and international surveillance
strategies while expanding on vaccine design.159 In the meantime it is also
imperative that we reexamine pandemic prevention preparedness plans and
develop strategies to guard against influenza in a non-agent specific manner. In
addition, influenza information and education needs to be expanded and tailored
to the general public. This will lead to benefits in the control of seasonal
influenza and help preemptively plan for the next pandemic.
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Summary
The purpose of my Capstone project is to explore both the historical and
scientific significance of the 1918 influenza pandemic. The goal of my project is
to create a better understanding of the contributions leading to one of the deadliest
pandemics in our nation’s history by investigating the social and historical
response, while also scientifically studying the how specific proteins of the virus
affect the virulence of the virus and the host immune response.
My projected is aimed at answering the question: what caused the 1918
influenza pandemic to become so fatal? Using historical archives I focused my
historical analysis on the response of the United States Public Health Service and
how its public health officials communicated with the different levels of public
health authorities. Specifically, my research was focused on the use of nonpharmaceutical interventions, which are defined as measures used for prevention
and control that do not require pharmaceuticals such as vaccines or antiviral
medications. These methods can be classified into further categories that involve
limiting the international spread of the virus, reducing the spread in local and
national populations, reducing the individual person’s risk for infection, and
communicating the risks and educating the public. For the purposes of this
paper, I limited my definition to interventions used to prevent the spread the
influenza in the United States at the local and national levels. I classified these
interventions into three categories that included school closings, cancellation of
public gatherings, and isolation and quarantine measures.
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An interesting discovery made by Alfred Crosby in 1976, in his book
America’s Forgotten Pandemic, was that on average among college graduates in
the United States, most students knew more about the Bubonic Plague of the
fourteenth century than they did about the 1918 pandemic. Crosby went on to
analyze possible explanations as to why America has tended to forget about the
1918 pandemic, and in the fourth chapter I expand on Crosby’s analysis. There
were a number of factors, which included that the pandemic was masked by the
horrors of the war and that the physiology of influenza infection allowed many
people get over the horrors of the disease. Unlike smallpox or polio, influenza
does not leave permanent scars nor is it physically disfiguring. Therefore, once
the influenza pandemic passed, there was no evidence that it had occurred.
In addition to Crosby’s analysis I also ask the question: why have we
suddenly gained more interest in the 1918 pandemic? Within the last ten years
there has been a dramatic increase in the amount of publications (both historic and
scientific) on the 1918 influenza pandemic. Part of this reason is that scientific
research has finally caught up to historical analysis, with the reconstruction of the
full 1918 influenza virus in 2005. In addition, the outbreak of highly pathogenic
avian influenza in 1997 forced the world to remember the horrors of the 1918
pandemic. Experts agree that it is only a matter of time before we are faced with
another influenza pandemic. Currently, the 1918 pandemic remains the best
model we have for studying the effects that this pandemic may have on a modern
global community. Therefore, it is no longer feasible to forget about the 1918
influenza pandemic.
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The second part of my paper is a scientific analysis of the virulence of the
1918 influenza virus and a study of the host immune response in the presence of
influenza virus infection. Specifically, this focuses on how the host cells respond
to viral infection and the mechanisms that are related to an increase in the
replication of the virus within the host itself. We created a mutated virus that
consisted of seven genes from a low pathogenic virus and the eighth gene from a
highly pathogenic 1918 virus, and compared this to a non-mutated low pathogenic
virus. The NS1 protein was selected because it is very similar in sequence across
different virus strains. In addition it is known to suppress interferon-beta, a cellsignaling protein that is produced by the immune system and warns surrounding
cells of the presence of viral infection. Since the NS1 protein is highly conserved
and because it plays an important role in limiting the response of the immune
system within the host, it is hypothesized that this protein may contribute to the
virulence of the virus. If this is found to be true, it would provide an additional
target for vaccine development. The results of my experiment showed that the
NS1 protein of the 1918 influenza virus was a greater suppressor of interferonbeta early on in viral infection; however, there was not a dominant difference in
overall gene expression patterns between the two viruses.
The second part of my scientific research was a study of the cellular
protein P58IPK. This protein has been found to interact and inhibit multiple eIF-2α
kinases and therefore it is suggested that it is both a critical regulator of cellular
and viral mRNA translation. This means that we believe P58IPK is an important
protein that plays a part in protein synthesis under normal cellular conditions, and
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in the presence of influenza virus it is hijacked by the virus to help in its
replication. The goal of my project was to find a way to over express P58IPK in
mammalian cells so that it would be possible to purify this protein and identify
addition protein-protein interactions of this protein besides the two pathways that
we were already familiar with. I succeeded with this task, and through the use of
mass spectrometry we were able to identify additional protein partners that were
enriched in the presence of over expressed P58IPK.
This project is significant because it provides a unique approach to
studying the 1918 influenza pandemic that incorporates both scientific and
historical analyses. Social, political, and economic factors interact with
ecological factors to drive influenza viruses to respond through biological and
genetic factors, thus evading human defense mechanisms. The challenge to the
prevention and control of influenza as a natural threat, therefore, elucidates the
ultimate challenge of addressing the convergence of factors that led to its
emergence in the first place. In a modern day global community, the need for an
interdisciplinary approach cannot be overstressed. Therefore, connecting present
day scientific research with analyses of past historical events can serve as a model
for future interdisciplinary collaborations.
While scientific research and vaccine design will be crucial to preventing
future pandemics, scientific experts have yet to come up with a way to develop a
universal influenza vaccine. Therefore, although scientific research cannot be
ignored, it is just as crucial to develop proper preparedness plans that could delay
the onset of influenza pandemics while vaccines are being produced. Therefore,
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in a modern day global community it is imperative that social scientists and
natural scientists work together to develop an effect plan for preventing future
pandemics.

